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PANEL DISCUSSION: CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY
DROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Good morning. On behalf of the
Fordham Law School Graduate Program, I want to welcome you
here for a day-long conference dealing with the subject of consumer
bankruptcy.
The subject of consumer bankruptcy has achieved high visibility
over the last few years. This stems principally from the dramatic in-
crease in the number of consumers who are now choosing the bank-
ruptcy option. Led by consumer-related bankruptcies, the number of
bankruptcy filings reached an all-time high in 1996, when consumer
bankruptcy filings exceeded the one-million mark for the first time in
history.' Projections for 1997 are even higher.2 In fact, a new record
for filings in the second quarter was established this year, when
367,000 bankruptcy cases were filed. This indicates an annual total of
close to 1,500,000.4 This means that the total number of bankruptcy
filings in 1997 is now expected to exceed those in 1996 by some 23%. 5
On the other hand, while 1997 is expected to set an all-time record
for the number of bankruptcy filings, it may be that the peak growth
rate has been reached and passed. It is significant that the rate of
creditor charge-offs showed a decline in June and in July.6
Analyses of the problem-if, indeed, there is a problem-differ. In
the second quarter of 1997, commercial banks set an all-time earnings
record. The banking system is acknowledged by both the banks them-
selves and by their regulators to be in excellent financial condition,
despite consumer lenders' loss of some $40 billion per year as a result
of consumer bankruptcies.7
1. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: The National Data Book 555 tbl.881 (1998).
2. See infra notes 4-5.
3. See American Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Statistics from the American Bank-
ruptcy Institute (visited Mar. 11, 1999) <http'/www.abiworld.org/statsstats.html> (tal-
lying 367,168 total bankruptcies in the second quarter of 1997).
4. Professor Felsenfeld's prediction was slightly over the mark. In 1997,
1,350,118 petitions were filed or are pending. See American Bankr. Inst., supra note 3
(collecting data from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts).
5. In fact, the total number of bankruptcy filings increased by 19% in 1997. See
id.
6. A "charge-off" is a credit card debt that a bank writes off as uncollectible. See
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71
Am. Bankr. LJ. 249, 251 (1997).
7. See Consumer Bankruptcy in tie Balance: Providing an Effective Safety Net
for Overwhelmed Families-Testimony of tire National Consumer Law Center Before
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Regulatory Relief, 52 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 185, 188 (1998) (testi-
mony of Gary Klein). The $40 billion figure has been severely criticized. See id.
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It may be that those who suffer the most from high rates of con-
sumer default and bankruptcy are consumers, both the consumer
debtors themselves, who cannot repay all of what they borrow, and
the consumers who pay on time but must pay higher prices to cover
the cost of those who do not. Creditors have been criticized for lend-
ing too much,8 and perhaps the diminishing rate of charge-offs already
mentioned has started to reflect a measure of creditor restraint.
One also has begun to see the imposition by the credit card lenders
of tighter credit standards and a reduction in the solicitation of new
debt.9 But these measures can also adversely affect many consumers.
For example, when creditors tighten standards, it reduces credit avail-
ability, particularly for consumers at the margin.
A significant piece of this mix is the nature of our bankruptcy laws.
Perhaps they are part of the problem of consumer debt as well as be-
ing part of the solution. In Roman times, bankrupts were frequently
killed as a punishment for the non-payment of debt. Today, their un-
paid debts are discharged and they are welcomed into a growing fra-
ternity where it is no disgrace to be bankrupt. In the Bankruptcy
Code, they are no longer even called bankrupts.' 0
A question now asked is whether the laws are too lenient and
whether the startling rise in the number of consumer bankrupts results
from their-and their lawyers'-realization that, however much they
may earn, they do not have to pay their debts.
It has been proposed that the law be changed so that some part of
income earned after a bankruptcy be applied to debt that is dis-
charged. 1 The concept is called "needs-based bankruptcy," and it is a
much-debated proposal.' 2
An overall review of the Bankruptcy Code has been undertaken by
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, established by Con-
gress in 1994.13 Its final report is due on October 20, but there have
been a number of disclosures of what that report will contain. Judge
Edith Jones, with us today, is a member of the Commission and may
have something to say about its report.
8. See Ausubel, supra note 6, at 264-70.
9. See David F. Snow, The Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt: New Develop-
ments and the Need for a New Direction, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 63, 65-66 (1998).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (1994) (replacing the term "bankrupt" with the term
"debtor").
11. See, e.g., Responsible Borrower Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2500, 105th
Cong. (1997) (prescribing guidelines for needs-based bankruptcy).
12. For discussions of needs-based bankruptcy, see Richard E. Coulson, Substan-
tial Abuse of Bankruptcy Code Section 707(b): An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor
Need, 52 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 261, 283 (1998); Gary Klein, Means Tested Bank-
ruptcy: What Would It Mean?, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 711, 729-37 (1998); Jeffrey A.
Logan, Comment, The Troubled State of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and Proposals for
Reform, 51 SMU L. Rev. 1569, 1593-97 (1998).
13. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 602, 108 Stat.
4107, 4147 (establishing the National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
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Our program today will start with some informal, but prepared, re-
marks by our five speakers. This will be followed by a group
discussion.
We are fortunate to have an outstanding panel here today to discuss
consumer bankruptcy. They are the Honorable Edith Jones,1" Jane
McNamara,15 Karen Gross,16 Henry ("Hank") Hildebrand, 7 and
Michael McEneney.'8
Our first speaker is Judge Jones, who is a member of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission. Judge Jones, it is a pleasure to have
you here.
JUDGE JONES: Thank you, Professor Felsenfeld. My claim to
fame with regard to being on the Commission is that I did practice
bankruptcy law before I went on the court-practiced it very inten-
sively under the new Code, mostly in the Chapter 11 area. I have
become much more acquainted with consumer bankruptcy during the
course of the Commission.
14. United States Court of Appeals Judge for the Fifth Circuit. Judge Jones is a
graduate of the University of Texas Law School, where she was an Editor of the Law
Review. She was an associate with Andrews & Kurth, a law firm in Houston, and
became a partner in 1982. She become a judge at the Court of Appeals in 1985 and,
among her other honors, Judge Jones was a member of the National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission.
15. Executive Vice President of Credit Counseling Center, Inc. Ms. McNamara
graduated from Michigan State University, earning a Bachelor of Science and a
Master of Arts from Michigan State University. She joined the Credit Counseling
Center in 1980 as a credit counselor and is currently Executive Vice President. In
1985 she was President of the Society of Consumer Affairs Professionals, one of the
ranking positions in her field.
16. Professor of Law at the New York Law School, specializing in bankruptcy law.
Professor Gross is a graduate of Smith College. She graduated from Temple Univer-
sity Law School, having spent her third year of law school at the University of Chi-
cago. She was an associate with Weil Gotshal & Manges in New York. She joined
New York Law School in 1984, became a full professor in 1989, and remains there
today. Professor Gross speaks frequently on the subject of bankruptcy, and has been
in regular communication with the Bankruptcy Review Commission on a number of
other problems.
Professor Gross has written a fascinating book on bankruptcy, called Failure and
Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System, published in 1997 by the Yale Uni-
versity Press.
17. Standing Chapter 13 Trustee. Mr. Hildebrand is also a Standing Chapter 12
Trustee, which he has been since 1986. He is a partner in the Nashville law firm of
Lassiter Tidwell & Hildebrand. Mr. Hildebrand attended Vanderbilt University and
George Washington Law School and has held a number of prominent positions in the
bankruptcy field, including committees of the American Bar Association and the
American Bankruptcy Institute.
18. Partner, Morrison & Foerster, Washington, D.C. Mr. McEneney graduated
from Manhattan College and the Boston University Law School. He was a senior
accountant for Price Waterhouse until 1987, when he joined San Francisco-based
Morrison & Foerster, and is a partner in its Washington, D.C. office. Mr. McEneney
specializes in creditor-side bankruptcy work.
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I think I can best use my time by summarizing the two approaches
to consumer bankruptcy law that will be contained in the Commission
report. 19
The Commission was deeply divided on the proper approach to
consumer bankruptcy law. To be quite honest, I think when the Com-
mission started out nobody anticipated there would be such a strong
focus on this area. At that time-November 1994-the economy was
in pretty good shape, and the number of bankruptcies had actually
stabilized at a modest rate of about 850,000 a year. 0 Although this
was a much higher rate than when the Code was passed," it appeared
that the number had peaked.
Suddenly, in 1996 the number began to skyrocket.22 Perhaps, if you
want to draw a crude cause-and-effect analysis, it was because of fear
that the Commission would change the Bankruptcy Code. We will let
Mr. McEneney speculate on that. Nevertheless, this dramatic in-
crease, followed by another dramatic increase that is ongoing right
now,' has suddenly put a great deal of pressure on the issues sur-
rounding consumer bankruptcy.- 4
The Commission report contains two starkly different approaches to
what should be done. Five of the Commissioners will file a majority
report that can be summarized by saying that the number of filings in
bankruptcy is irrelevant to social welfare concerns;2 5 that the choice
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is irrelevant-or perhaps that
Chapter 7 filings are socially preferable; and that bankruptcy ought to
serve the function of enacting Fair Credit Provisions in addition to and
apart from those that already exist in state and various federal laws.26
First, let me note the areas in which all nine Commissioners agree.
We all subscribe to the need for better education, either before or
after the fiings-afterwards only if it is not possible to do sufficient
credit counseling in advance to prevent bankruptcies.2 7
19. National Bankr. Review Comm'n, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years (1997)
[hereinafter Report].
20. Bureau of the Census, supra note 1, at 555 tbl.881 (stating that in 1994 there
were 845,257 bankruptcy filings).
21. There were about 440,000 bankruptcies in 1982. See David Shribman, Bank-
ruptcies Clog Courts and May Slow Economy's Revival, New York Times, Sept. 30,
1982, at Al.
22. See American Bankr. Inst., supra note 3. Bankruptcy filings increased from
926,601 in 1995 to 1,178,555 in 1996 and 1,404,145 in 1997. See id.
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24. See Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 Ind. L.J. 1079, 1079-80
(1998).
25. See Report, supra note 19, at 86-87.
26. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693p (1994)).
27. See Report, supra note 19, § 1.1.5, at 1.
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We all agree that some sort of random audit system needs to be
installed.'
We all agree that debtors who complete Chapter 13 plans ought to
get favorable treatment on their credit reports and the law should be
accordingly changed. 9
And we all agree that there should be a national filing system to
identify filers and prevent abusive repeat filings. 30
From there, there is little agreement. The significant features of the
majority report are, to me, eight in number:
The majority report would considerably limit reaffirmations.3'
Under present law, a debtor can reaffirm virtually any debt with or
without the guidance of counsel, although counsel is obligated to ex-
plain the consequences of reaffirmation. Such reaffirmations occur
very frequently under current law. The proposal would limit them to
only the secured portion of secured debts, thus eliminating reaffirma-
tions for unsecured debt.32
The proposal also suggests that the Bankruptcy Code treat rent-to-
own contracts as installment loans subject to limitation in the amount
that needs to be repaid in bankruptcy.33
With regard to housing, a modest incursion is made into the sanctity
of home loans by saying that if a loan-typically a debt consolidation
or home-repair loan-is entered into for more than the value of the
property at the time the loan was taken out-that is to say, a 125% or
so loan-to-value loan-the value of the loan will be reduced to the
value of the collateral at the time the loan was taken out.3
The proposal would eliminate security interests in bankruptcy for
goods with "a value of less than $500." 3- Well, I can guarantee that
there are very few items of household goods for most of us, to say
nothing of most consumer bankrupts, that are "valued at more than
$500" at the time of filing. So it basically transforms that entire indus-
try into unsecured lending.
Finally, the Commission takes a position on the Rash case,- saying
that the value of collateral ought to be wholesale and that the interest
rate-which is supposedly to adjust for the risk for the lender in mak-
28. See id § 1.1.2, at 1.
29. See id. H8 1.5.7-.9, at 8-9.
30. See i. § 1.1.1, at 1.
31. See id. § 1.3.1, at 3-4.
32. See Report, supra note 19, § 1.3.1, at 3-4.
33. See id. § 1.3.5, at 5.
34. See Report, supra note 19, § 1.5.2, at 7.
35. See i. § 1.3.4, at 4-5.
36. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
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ing a forced re-loan of the money involved in a cram-down-should
be the six-month T-bill rate.37
The Commission proposes uniform exemptions.38 I think, to one
degree or another, each except one of the Commissioners might sup-
port an approach to uniform exemptions by making them federally
uniform or capping them. Four of us, however, do not support the
approach that was voted last week that would give $20,000 per debtor
in personal possessions-and, of course, if that is a husband and wife
that is $40,000-plus retirement funds, plus a minimum of $30,000 and
a maximum of $100,000 on equity in the home.39
The majority suggests that, as to credit cards, anything purchased
thirty-one days or more before bankruptcy is dischargeable if it is
within the authorized credit limit under the card.40 Anything thirty
days or less before bankruptcy is non-dischargeable.4" Therefore, it
does away with any kind of fraud or inability-to-repay criteria for
purchases more than thirty days before bankruptcy.42
Finally, on serial filings the majority proposes a sort of "three
strikes and you're out. ' '43 Otherwise you should not file more than
once every six years.
I suggest that the bottom-line impact of these proposals will be as
follows: First, there will be an increased number of bankruptcies; sec-
ond, there will be an increased proportion of Chapter 7s; and third,
there will be decreased available credit for the poor and the margin-
ally creditworthy, which I would be interested in hearing other people
speak about.
Four Commissioners, including myself, have taken a radically differ-
ent approach.44 We do not subscribe to any of what I call "fair credit
standards and lien-stripping proposals."
We believe that there is a considerably greater problem of bank-
ruptcy fraud than the majority do. Their only remedies are either the
37. See Report, supra note 19, § 1.5.3, at 7 ("Payments on secured debts that are
subject to modification should be spread over the life of the plan, according to fixed
criteria for interest rates.").
38. See id. §§ 1.2.1-.6, at 2-3.
39. See id. §§ 1.2.2-.3, at 2-3.
40. See id. § 1.4.1, at 5.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. § 1.5.5, at 7-8.
44. Judge Jones and Commissioner James I. Shepard fully explicated these views
in their dissent, Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Recommendations for Reform of
Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, in Report, supra note
19 [hereinafter, Jones & Shepard, Dissent]. Commissioners John A. Gose and Jeffery
J. Hartley concurred with "many of the substantive proposals" in the dissent, see id. at
1 n.******, however, they wrote a concurrence to it, see John A. Gose & Jeffery J.
Hartley, Commissioners Gose and Hartley: Concurrence with Consumer Dissenting
Opinion, in Report, supra note 19.
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"three strikes" provision,4" an in rem provision that is of some utility
around the country,4 6 and the threat of random audits. 47 We propose:
(1) that the Code require debtors to file their tax returns with their
petitions;' (2) that the Code require trustees to fie a certificate with
the court stating that debtors have fully cooperated with the trustee
before debtors obtain a discharge;4 9 and (3) that if debtors do not file
materially accurate schedules and statements of affairs to begin with,
then they ought to be penalized, either by the denial of a discharge or
the denial of some other benefits of bankruptcy."
People say, "Well, there is not a lot of fraud in consumer bank-
ruptcy." I do not disagree with that. I think the majority of debtors
are well-intentioned, although, unfortunately, they are not all well-
counseled. Even a fraud rate of only 5%, however, is 70,000 fraudu-
lent filings per year.5 I believe that is more than all of the criminal
prosecutions in federal courts each year.52 So, to me, that bespeaks a
significant social problem.
Our other recommendations are mainly geared toward clearing up
unclear provisions in the law. We have a slightly different approach
on the Rash53 case-we said the value of collateral should be the mid-
point between the wholesale and retail values-and I do not recall
whether we took a position on the interest rate.54
It is our view that the present bankruptcy law needs to be tightened
up considerably, that it is too vague, and that this creates a lot of un-
certainty around the country, which is unfair to debtors as well as to
creditors and increases the transactional costs of consumer
bankruptcy.55
45. See Report, supra note 19, § 1.5.5, at 7-8.
46. See id § 1.5.6, at 8.
47. See id § 1.1.2, at 1.
48. See Jones & Shepard, Dissent, supra note 44, at 19-20 (Editor's note. The vari-
ous dissents and commentaries in chapter five of the Report are each separately
paginated.).
49. See id
50. See id
51. See American Bankr. Inst., supra note 3. Based on 1997 figures, five percent
of annual bankruptcy filings is approximately 70,200. See id.
52. In the twelve-month period that ended Sept. 30, 1997, 49,279 federal prosecu-
tions were commenced in U.S. District Courts. See Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 1997 184 tbl.D-1 (1997). Thirty-
two thousand, one hundred fifty-six federal criminal prosecutions were pending on
Oct. 1, 1996. See id
53. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997)
54. See Report, supra note 19, §§ 1.5.2-.3, at 101.
55. See Jones & Shepard, Dissent, supra note 44, at 71-72 (Editor's note. The vari-
ous dissents and commentaries in chapter five of the Report are each separately
paginated.).
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A couple of us, at least, think that the time has come to consider
means testing.5 6 I do not call it "needs-based"; I call it "means test-
ing" by way of drawing an analogy between bankruptcy relief and that
relief which constitutes other portions of society's social safety net.
All of the welfare programs that I know are subject to means testing-
whether they are Medicaid, or AFDC, or Food Stamps-and means
testing offers the opportunity for an entirely new review of the availa-
bility of bankruptcy relief.
I do not consider it involuntary servitude to tell people they ought
to pay back some of the money they have borrowed. When you have
used other people's money, most laymen on the street say you ought
to pay it back, and I do not see anything particularly extraordinary or
penal in asking people to do that to the best of their ability. If you see
people like actress Kim Basinger, Governor Symington in Arizona,
heart surgeon Dr. Denton Cooley, and former Baseball Commissioner
Bowie Kuhn, taking full advantage of the bankruptcy laws when we all
know that they have huge earning capacity in the future, of course
there is going to be some manipulation and abuse. I think the time
has come to stop that.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you.
Our next speaker is Jane McNamara. Thank you for being with us,
Jane.
MS. McNAMARA: Thank you.
I am going to talk about alternatives to bankruptcy from the per-
spective of family financial counseling.
I am sure you are going to hear lots of statistics today. I am going
to give you a perspective from comparisons of primarily Chapter 13s
to doing credit or debt counseling. It is referred to many different
ways. I refer to it as "family financial counseling" because if you do
not have the involvement of all the individuals in the family, you are
not going to have cooperation.
As Judge Jones mentioned, we have seen an increasing rise in bank-
ruptcies. In 1997, we are projecting 1.3 million. And, of course, the
numbers continue to go up.57
Well, what are we talking about in terms of the financial health of
the consumer?
Income has been fiat for about the last twenty years, despite a 56%
increase in two-income households. 8
Debt itself is at or near record levels for individual households, with
a debt-to-payment ratio about 20% of take-home pay.
56. See Edith H. Jones and James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommenda-
tions for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, in Report, supra note 19, at 15.
57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
58. See John McNeil, U.S. Department of Commerce, Changes in Median House-
hold Income: 1969 to 1996, at 1 (1998) (noting that median household income rose "a
very modest" 6.3% from 1969 to 1996).
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Bank card delinquencies are currently running at 3.69%, which is
much, much higher than what we normally see. 9
Savings: only 57% of households save; 27% save for retirement and
56% have pensions.
Net worth: the average is $52,000.60 This is an average of everyone
from one extreme to the other-from Bill Gates to ADC mothers.6'
Seven percent of everyone out there is considered insolvent or eligi-
ble for bankruptcy because they did not pay their debts.6"
The individuals that we typically see at Credit Counseling Center
have:
Gross income of about $26,000.
Total debt of about $19,000.
A debt-to-income ratio of 71%.
Ten creditors only.
An insolvency ratio of 86%.
The amount we are asking individuals to bring to us in order for us
to pay their creditors is $348, but the amount we actually receive from
them is $286, so the percentage of deposits received is about 82%.
What are we seeing in terms of a record number of people filing
bankruptcy? Well, many consumers are financially illiterate. We do
not teach personal finance in the school system. We do not teach con-
sumers how much credit they really can afford. There are too many
living on the edge. Wages are down in real dollars.63 Divorces and
uninsured medical bills are causing people to file bankruptcies. 6'
Moreover, creditors are going deeper into the risk pool to obtain
customers.65
What can be done to help reduce bankruptcy losses?
* Consumer education and money management. It ought to be a
requirement that everyone have a course in personal finance
before they get out of high school.
" Tighter underwriting by creditors.
59. See Ausubel, supra note 6, at 249 (noting that credit card delinquencies ex-
ceeded 3.5%, which was the highest rate recorded since such records were created).
60. See Bureau of the Census, supra note 1, at 482 tbl.767.
61. See id.
62. One commentator has posited that as many as 15% of U.S. households may
benefit financially by filing for bankruptcy. See Michelle J. White, Why Don't More
Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. Econ. & Org. 205, 206 (1998).
63. The median income of all families in 1996 was $42,300. See Bureau of the Cen-
sus, supra note 1, at 472 tbl.746. Median income peaked in 1989 at $43290, in 1996
dollars. See id.
64. See Warren, supra note 24, at 1084 (observing that some individuals may carry
high, manageable debt until a crisis occurs).
65. See id. at 1083 ("When the [credit] cards are highly profitable, credit card issu-
ers have a strong incentive to distribute them to marginal borrowers and to borrowers
already loaded with debts, which increases both the issuer's profits and its loan
defaults.").
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" Early referrals to the National Foundation for Consumer Credit
member agencies' consumer credit counseling services.
" Finally, creditors' making concessions by cutting interest rates
and eliminating service fees.
When an individual comes to us for counseling, we do a budget
analysis. We assess what their spending is on secured debt, unsecured
debt, and household expenses. We then assess whether or not we can
help them and explain to them alternatives, including bankruptcy.
If we can help them, we set them up on a "debt repayment pro-
gram" or a "debt management program." We negotiate terms of re-
payment with their creditors. The individuals then give us their
money, we pay their creditors on their behalf, and we teach them how
to manage their money. Unfortunately, some people do not learn
that. An awful lot of them, however, do.
When we negotiate with creditors, we need concessions in order for
the program to work. We need to them to cut or eliminate interest
rates and service fees, because otherwise while we are making a mini-
mal payment on a credit card, for example, the interest rates and fees
just increase that balance. So even though an individual may want to
pay, it is very difficult for them to make any headway in terms of re-
ducing those balances.
The National Foundation for Consumer Credit ("NFCC") has a
large network. What do we do? We teach financial literacy to people.
We provide free preventative education to millions of people each
year. We provide remedial education to about as many people as
those filing bankruptcy. We can also assure the consumers that they
will receive a quality service.
The NFCC requires member agencies to become accredited by the
Council of Accreditation for Families and Children Services here in
New York. They are an independent organization that has a peer re-
view system and certain standards that insure that we provide quality
service. It is, as I refer to it, a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Ap-
proval," if you will, that can assure the consumer that if they come to
an NFCC member agency, then they will receive a certain level of
service.
In 1983, there were 207 NFCC offices. In 1997, there will be about
1400. Over the years the number of locations throughout the United
States has increased because of the increasing need for the service.
The number of people that we see through educational presenta-
tions continues to increase greatly on an annual basis. In 1997, over
two million consumers or customers will contact our counseling agen-
cies, hoping to avoid bankruptcy.
An awful lot of people do not know the service exists. I know we
have someone here from Visa International. They have very gra-
ciously committed dollars to provide a national advertising campaign
1324 [Vol. 67
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in major cities of the United States to help consumers become aware
that we are out there and that we are an alternative to bankruptcy.
There are more new debt management programs established on an
annual basis than Chapter 13 filings. In 1995, there were more Chap-
ter 13 filings. In 1996, however, there were more debt management
programs. That will also be the case in 1997.
What are the results of counseling?
* Thirty-four percent go on a debt management program.
" Seven percent are recommended to a legal advisor.
" Twenty-five percent are on assignment. Debtors on assignment
may not have the money to make their regularly scheduled pay-
ments, but they make a decision that they do not want to commit
to a program.
* Thirty-four percent are given budget counseling. Approximately
half of the 972,000 individuals counseled in 1996 closed success-
fully. The other half closed unsuccessfully, primarily because we
could not reduce their debt fast enough.
In 1997, our agencies will return $4 billion to the credit community
though these efforts.
Of those people who we do set up on debt management programs:
• Five percent file bankruptcy.
" Forty-eight percent do not pay us. If they do not pay us, we can-
not help them. We do not do anything for them they could not do
for themselves. We are there to help them help themselves.
" Twenty-five percent complete the program, where all of their
debts are paid off to their creditors.
" Twenty-two percent who are on the program for a while decide
the crisis has been reduced, they now can handle things more ef-
fectively, they have learned how to budget, and they will handle
the payment of their creditors themselves.
A debt management program provides some of the benefits of a
Chapter 7 or 13 bankruptcy. For example, a debt management pro-
gram in many cases can stop collection efforts. In most cases, we can
eliminate interest because a number of major creditors have commit-
ted to stop interest when an individual signs up on a program with us.
Of course, if a consumer stops paying us and we drop them from the
program, all of these benefits go away.
Can we eliminate principal? No, and that is not why we are there.
We have a philosophy that credit is a privilege, not a right, and con-
sumers have a responsibility to repay the credit that they assume. Do
we reduce principal? Yes.
On the average, a program lasts for three to five years. In my par-
ticular agency, in Michigan, people stay in a debt management pro-
gram about sixteen months. We have seven offices in Metropolitan
New York, and here people stay on the program about eight months.
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Many consumers want to pay, but it is really a delicate balance. We
need creditor cooperation because without it the balances owed are
going to continue to increase on unsecured debt. We need them to
reduce or eliminate finance charges and waive late or over-limit fees.
How long does it take consumers to repay? If we do not have credi-
tor concessions, it can be as long as eight years; if we have 50% credi-
tor concessions, 4.9 years; if we have 100% creditor concessions, 3.5
years. This is for an average debt repayment or indebtedness of about
$19,000, so this is a long time.
I want to briefly give you some statistics from my organization. We
are one of the largest of this type of service in the United States.
* As of December 31, 1996, we had thirty-seven branch locations:
thirty in Michigan, one in Illinois, and six at that point in Metro-
politan New York. We since have opened another office here in
New York.
" We had close to 11,000 client accounts at year-end.
* We disbursed close to $74 million. This year it will be about $100
million.
* Net revenue for our agency was about $284,000. The revenue
that we make-we are a not-for-profit-goes back into providing
new services and expanding the business, opening more offices.
" We have 144 full-time and seven part-time employees.
The demographics of an average client:
" Average age: 36 in Michigan, slightly less than New York.
" Family members: 2.6 in Michigan, 2.1 in New York.
" We see more married people in Michigan and Illinois than here in
New York. Although we have more divorces in Michigan and we
have fewer single people, we see many more single people here.
* Number of creditors: fifteen in Michigan, ten in New York.
" Total indebtedness, not including mortgage: about $28,000 in
Michigan, $24,000 in New York.
Prior to our panel discussion, I emailed the branch managers and
asked them to go through their closed accounts and pull some infor-
mation for me on individuals that they have seen in the past ninety
days who had filed bankruptcy. Sixteen of the thirty-six offices re-
sponded. This information I am going to share with you consists of
seventy clients, about 6% of our total client base.
" Thirty-eight were single, thirty-two married; forty-three males
and twenty-seven females.
" Age ranges: The largest number were 30-39, the next category
being 40-49. We do see some retirees and people that are on
fixed incomes, many who surprisingly had credit card debt, that
come to us for help, and many who use credit cards for cash ad-
vances and to pay physicians as well as to pay for medication.
" Forty-two of the seventy people were blue collar, twenty-eight
white collar, and two retired people.
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" The monthly net income of the clients ranged predominantly in
the $2000-$2999 range. The next-largest category, below $2000 a
household. Although we see expenses considerably higher, 25-
30% higher, here in New York versus Michigan, we see salaries at
the same level or less. So even though it costs more to live here,
salaries are comparable to what we see in Michigan.
* The amounts owing by our particular clients who filed a bank-
ruptcy ranged from $6600 to $126,000. The total amount of dol-
lars lost in these seventy client cases was $2.5 million.
JUDGE JONES: Dollars lost to their creditors or to the clients?
MS. McNAMARA: Dollars lost to the creditors. This is the
amount that was owed. The average amount of debt owed was about
$36,000, but the total amount lost that would not be repaid to the
credit community was $2.5 million.
The type of indebtedness that the people had who filed:
" Almost every one had credit cards.
" Auto loans-we do not see as many of those here in New York as
we do in Michigan.
" Medical bills.
" Student loans.
" Judgments and taxes that were owed.
" Cash advances that were taken.
" Boat loans.
* Gambling. People take cash advances on credit cards to not only
facilitate the gambling but to help cover their losses.
Reasons they originally visited us:
* They were over-extended or it was a money mismanagement
problem.
" Divorce.
" Reduced income.
• Medical problems and bills.
* High interest rates.
* Individuals helping children financially. We are seeing people
who theoretically should be "empty nesters" who are not because
their grown children are moving back home.
* People living beyond their means.
• And again, gambling being a problem.
Why did they file bankruptcy?
" Predominantly it was a reduction in income or job loss.
" Creditor pressure was the number two reason why they filed
bankruptcy.
* They were unable to maintain their arrangements with us, the
amount of dollars they committed to give to us in order for us to
pay their creditors.
" They just gave up. The home budget was too tight and they did
not want to live with that for two or three years.
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" Living beyond their means-there were a few of these, but they
were not predominate.
" Illness of the clients themselves or a family member that they
were supporting.
" There was legal action pending and it could be stopped through a
bankruptcy.
" There was a death in the family.
We see consumers from all walks of life, and it is a misconception
that people that use our services are low-income. That is not the case.
There is a responsibility to repay debt, but if people do not know
consumer credit counseling services are out there and we are an alter-
native, many of them end up, obviously, in bankruptcy. That is some-
thing that we want to avoid.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Jane. I am sure we will
have a lot to say about those statistics in the course of the day because
I think there is a great deal to be learned from them.
Our next speaker is Karen Gross.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Thank you. It is nice to be here, and it is
nice to have an opportunity to talk about these issues.
My presentation is of a slightly different nature than the others. It
is, perhaps not surprisingly, a little academic in nature. I took Carl at
his word, that my job was to chat with you about how one thinks
about balancing the interests of debtors and creditors.
While I spent a lot of my law practice years at big firms doing
largely Chapter 11 work, I did spend a significant portion of my last
sabbatical working with debtors at the New York Legal Aid Society.
In terms of my practice experience, the more recent of it has involved
real people with real debts.
I wanted to start with a couple of quotes about bankruptcy, the ear-
liest from 1790 and the most recent from 1970, without giving you the
dates or the sources, although I have them all. What is remarkable
about these quotes, I think, is that you cannot tell when they were
written. Let me read them to you without the dates and then we can,
if you want, later decipher them, and I can share with you some of my
thoughts about what they show.
Despite the stigma of bankruptcy and the evidence it gives of finan-
cial failure, debtors find it really no harder to get credit after bank-
ruptcy than they did before. Creditors take the risk of loss on bad
debts in order to do business.
Although the debtor is discharged of the debts listed in his bank-
ruptcy, he is sometimes harassed by his creditors about his dis-
charged debts, and sometimes makes binding new agreements to
pay them.6 6
66. David T. Stanley & Marjorie Girth, Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Reform 3-
4 (1971).
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Next quote:
Misfortune, enterprise, speculation, and a spirit of over-trading have
involved thousands into ruin. Widows and orphans, fair merchants,
industrious tradesmen, and incredulous friends, rise no more. Ve
should give to creditors a control over property of their debtors so
as to stop the fraudulent and we should rescue the honest and un-
fortunate insolvent from the oppression of a vindictive creditor.67
Next quote:
Riches carry influence into every society. Wealth is power. But an-
alyze the merit that is found to consist in virtue, in honor, in benev-
olence. I believe there has never been a criminal code, either in
ancient or modem times, which has denounced poverty as a crime.
The Gospel inculcates the sentiment of mercy to our debtors. The
gates of Heaven were unfolded to receive Lazarus. It is a fact noto-
rious in the history of all nations that the arbitrary and uncontrolled
power which has been vested in the creditor has convulsed to its
center in almost every community.68
Let me stop there. The first quote is recent; it is from the 1970s and
it is in The Brookings Report on Bankrupty.69 The second one was
from the 1790s, by Senator Harrison Wright Otis. 70 The last one was
from 1823 in a speech by someone named Colonel Richard Johnson.7
I could keep going. There are similar quotes from others, but what
is remarkable, and what these quotes demonstrate to me, is that the
debate about debtors and creditors and how to think about them goes
back certainly to our earliest history, if not before. This debate is re-
ally a very fundamental one about human nature, about how people
live in a market-based economy, about freedom, about choice, and
about economic and political and social theory. It is no wonder that
resolution is very hard to come by.
As Judge Jones points out, there is a very clear split on the Commis-
sion between the majority and the minority,' and it is striking to me
that people would be surprised about that. It is not surprising because
what is at issue are very fundamental notions about how we believe
people act and behave. Indeed, in this area, reasonable people can
certainly differ, depending on one's perspective.
It seems to me, however, that in resolving these disputes, there is no
room for rudeness, acrimony, or petty politics. The issues are far too
important for that. They involve far too many people to land into
67. Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 17 (1935).
68. Col. Richard M. Johnson, "On a Proposition to Abolish Imprisonment for
Debt," speech submitted to the U.S. Senate, Jan. 14, 1823 (on file with Professor
Gross).
69. See supra note 66.
70. See supra note 67.
71. See supra note 68.
72. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
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either I call mono-perspectival approaches-i.e., you cannot approach
this either as a debtor representative or a creditor representative. We
have to approach these issues as thoughtful people trying to deal with
a very real and significant social issue.
As an historical matter, the majority and minority are not as far
apart as they could be. If you think of it as a spectrum, one end of the
spectrum would be to put debtors into jail. The other end of the spec-
trum would be to completely discharge all of their debts. Neither the
majority nor the minority is adopting an extremist position. I think
that is important to think about.
I would like to draw your attention to a new law review article by a
Iain Ramsay, a professor in Canada, that talks about three different
models for thinking about consumer bankruptcy. 73 He says that it is
pretty easy to come up with different models. You can think about
consumer bankruptcy laws as a response to deviant behavior, and if
you think about it that way, you can come up with one model;"4 you
can think about consumer bankruptcy as a kind of consumer protec-
tion;75 and lastly, you can think about bankruptcy as a kind of social
welfare system. 76 While I do not agree with everything he says, what
he is articulating is that there are lots of models and ways to think
about what is happening in the consumer system.
Having said that, how is it that I think we should think about bank-
ruptcy and what do I think we should bring to the table?
I think we know remarkably little about debtors and creditors. In-
deed, I think we know more about the mating habits of fruit flies than
we do about the behavior of debtors and creditors. That is not to say
that understanding fruit flies is insignificant, but it is to say that we
should care about who our debtors are and who our creditors are.
Let me give you a sense of what we do not know. We are develop-
ing a bankruptcy system, but we do not know the general age of our
debtors; we do not know their gender, their marital status, their
ethnicity, or their race. So, we develop a system without a very clear
picture of who the users of the system are.77
Similarly, there is a lot we do not know about creditors. We do not
know about a lot of their loss, and we do not know about the amount
they recover at the back end-either through repayment, through
sales of accounts to transferees, or through tax benefits.
In fact, it is quite striking, I think, that despite our effort to homog-
enize debtors and creditors, debtors and creditors within each group
73. See lain D.C. Ramsay, Models of Consumer Bankruptcy: Implications for Re-
search and Policy, 20 J. Consumer Policy 269, 270 (1997).
74. See Ramsay, supra note 73, at 270-74.
75. See id. at 274-78.
76. See id. at 278-82.
77. The empirical literature about debtors is growing. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al.,
The Fragile Middle Class (forthcoming 1999).
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are remarkably differently each from each other. When we speak
about "debtors," we are speaking about everyone from Kim Bas-
inger7" to the people I saw at Legal Aid. In other words, the range of
people is very different. So, to speak about bankruptcy as only involv-
ing the high profile players of the world is as anomalous as speaking
about bankruptcy as if the only debtors were Legal Aid clients.
Having said that we need more data to inform our thinking about
how to achieve a balance, let me raise the second issue: How should
we think about the question of abuse? Judge Jones was sort of getting
at that in her comments.79 I think that people are defining "abuse"
very differently, and that difference accounts in part for why the
camps are in such different places.
Until very recently, everybody was talking about debtor abuse.
Whether you find it depends on who is doing the looking and how you
define what they are looking at.m
Let me give you a question: Is a debtor who could repay creditors
in a Chapter 13 but instead elects to file a Chapter 7 abusing the bank-
ruptcy system? Well, there are people who answer that question,
"Yes, that is an abuse," and that leads to the kind of means-based
testing approach that Judge Jones talked about."1 That is because they
answered that question, "Yes."
Another group of people answer that same question, "No." Their
answer, I think, hinges on something like: "The fresh start is at the
core of our bankruptcy system. Indeed, it is what distinguishes us in
the United States from a host of other nations. It reveals our national
humanity. ''8
In essence, then, the way one answers that question helps one think
about why everybody characterizes the issue so differently.
Let me give you an example from a recent meeting at my son's high
school. The high school lets the freshmen off campus. There was a
whole debate because there is a sense that about ten of the 110 stu-
dents could/would/are abusing the privilege by smoking and drinking
while they are off campus. So, ten of the 110 students are behaving in
ways that we might not want as parents. The question is: How do you
think about the problem?
Well, there is a whole group of parents who say, "Oh my God, that
is a big problem. That means we've got to set up rules so that one-
78. See Judy Brennan, "Boxing Helena" Judge Won't Be Presiding Over Retrial,
Los Angeles Times, Dec. 15, 1994, at F2 (discussing Kim Basinger's bankruptcy,
which resulted from an adverse court judgment).
79. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
80. See Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumner Bankruptcy: Means
Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Counission's Proposals
as a Starting Point, 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1998).
81. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
82. See Gross, supra note 16, at 91-103 (discussing some of the values underlying
bankruptcy law, such as forgiveness and rehabilitation).
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hundred students who are not doing anything will not slide into this
terrible thing, and start smoking and drinking off campus. We've got
to watch out. We've got a real problem on our hands."
A whole other group of parents said: "Now, just a minute. I do not
see a problem. There are one-hundred students who are not doing
anything wrong, who are handling the freedom very well. Let them
have their freedom and let's focus on the ten students who are doing
something wrong and put our attention on the ten, as opposed to
changing the rules for all 110."
It is like the "good apple/bad apple" situation. When you look at a
bucket of apples, do you see the bad ones or do you see the good
ones?
I tell many people that the problem of how you characterize the
bankruptcy system reminds me of how you think about the presump-
tion of innocence. Our legal system, the criminal law part, operates
off of a presumption of innocence. When you have that presumption
it does mean that some guilty people go free; that is an inevitable con-
sequence of that system. Now, you could have a different system.
You could have a system that started with a presumption of guilt, and
if you had that system some innocent people would be imprisoned.
For me, the question is: with which presumption-given that
neither is perfect-are you more comfortable living? I can answer
that question for you in terms of what my perspective is, and I would
be happy to do that later in the conversation.
I raise it here, however, because it is a choice people are making
about how to think about issues. In that sense, I think it is very critical
to recognize that the issues at stake in the bankruptcy debate are very
fundamental to what we believe in.
Having said that, let me just raise another issue in terms of balance.
All the attention, until recently, has been on debtor abuse. There may
be lots of reasons for that. But, I have said to people that the best
thing that ever happened to debtors was the millionth filing83 and the
Sears debacle,84 for two reasons. First of all, the millionth filing for
calendar year 1996 made people recognize that bankruptcy is not a
small problem, and we ought to all be paying attention to it.
83. Bankruptcy filings exceeded one million for calendar year 1996. See American
Bankr. Inst., supra note 4.
84. See In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 332 (Bankr. D. Mass 1997) (stating that
Sears, Roebuck & Co. admitted that, as a matter of policy, it routinely received reaf-
firmation agreements and did not file the reaffirmation agreements with the bank-
ruptcy courts); see also Karen Gross, As We Fleece Our Debtors, 102 Dickinson L.
Rev. 747, 749 (1998) (discussing the need for an examination of reaffirmation agree-
ments); Bruce Mohl, Sears to Pay State, Residents $10.82 Million, Boston Globe, Sept.
4, 1997, at D2 (reporting that Sears coerced hundreds of thousands of debtors to sign
invalid reaffirmation agreements). Sears settled these claims for $290 million, see
Mohl, supra, and, recently, Sears officials pled guilty to criminal charges, see Ruth
Ranalli, Sears Unit Is Fined $60 Million, Boston Globe, Feb. 10, 1999, at 35.
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The Sears debacle also made people realize that big-time creditors
were abusing-if one wants to use that word-misusing their power in
the bankruptcy system and violating the bankruptcy laws. When you
see big players-like Sears and Federated Department Stores and
General Electric's GE Capital Unit-being referred to in newspapers
and in settlements and in class actions,s you have to start to believe
that the problem is not just debtor abuse. When one looks at big play-
ers and big money doing things in the bankruptcy law that should
make us worry, one gets a little bit skeptical about everybody focusing
on so-called "debtor abuse." It strikes me as a little bit of the pot
calling the kettle black.
So, given that all of this depends on an absence of data and how we
think about it depends on one's characterization, is there anything
that I think one could achieve without lots of controversy?
I would like to think that one thing that should not be controversial
is debtor education. It makes sense to have voluntary, census-based-
not federally funded, not bureaucratic-education for the debtors in
our bankruptcy system. This suggestion is not intended to diminish
pre-bankruptcy debtor education, but it is to say that those in the sys-
tem deserve more than a legal fresh start; they should get the tools to
re-enter the credit marketplace as thoughtful and responsible consum-
ers of credit.
Indeed, we ought to think about Canada. Canada is the only nation
in North America with a mandatory debtor education program." I
am not suggesting that ours be mandatory. What I am suggesting is
that our neighbors from the North have a little bit to give us here in
terms of how to think about this. It seems to me that debtor educa-
tion makes very good sense.
I have a number of comments that I hope to share with the other
participants, but why don't I stop there.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Karen.
Our next speaker is Henry ("Hank") Hildebrand.
MR. HILDEBRAND: My perspective a little bit different from
those you have heard so far. My perspective is essentially
microeconomic, as opposed to macroeconomic. I guess in that context
I present to you greetings from the bankruptcy capital of the world,
Tennessee-although I have been advised by my friends in Atlanta
85. See Mohl, supra note 84. Federated owns Macy's and Bloomingdales, and it
settled similar claims for $35 million. See id. GE Capital also recently settled a class-
action lawsuit regarding unfiled reaffirmation agreements for S147 million to 100,00
class members. See Final Accord in G.E. Debt Collection Suit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1999, at C14.
86. Professor Gross discusses Canadian mandatory debtor education in slightly
greater detail in Karen Gross, Preliminary Proposal on Debtor Education Program
Options, 51 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 23, 23 (1997).
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that they now claim to be number one.87 What I mean by that is that
last year one family out of forty in Tennessee filed bankruptcy.
I started as a Chapter 13 Trustee back in the era when nobody
wanted to be a Trustee. As a matter of fact, I was appointed when I
was out of town. I started as a Chapter 13 Trustee and assumed re-
sponsibility for about 1800 cases. We had about sixty new Chapter 13
cases filed every month and we disbursed about $6 million a year to
creditors.
Now I am a Trustee supervising about 14,000 active Chapter 13
cases. We get about 500 new Chapter 13 cases every month. This year
we will disburse just shy of $80 million to creditors.
In Tennessee, we are a little different than the rest of the world, and
certainly different than up here in the Northeast. Most of the people
who come to bankruptcy court in Tennessee file for Chapter 13. They
file under the repayment bankruptcy system. That tends to be true in
districts that are located in the Southeast. Thus, the districts in which
the majority of bankruptcy filings are fied under Chapter 13 are in
North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Texas, and Puerto
Rico. With the exception of Puerto Rico, we are talking about one
quadrant of the country.
I have frequently been asked why is this and what happens? Well, I
grew up right outside of New York. This is a little bit like coming
home to me. When I grew up life was a whole lot different than it is
now. I grew up in a kind of a traditional suburban life. My Dad
caught the train to work and Mom stayed home; Dad earned and
Mama took care of the family.
When my father went and got a mortgage on the house, he met with
the banker and they had a discussion. He complained-very loudly, I
recall-about having to pay 5% interest instead of 4%. That dates
me, too, by the way.
In my neighborhood, when somebody's dad got sick, mom went to
work. That was perceived as a difficult sacrifice: "Gee, they really
have got to pull themselves together. They are really working real
hard to do this."
Well, as you saw in the numbers, there are a lot of folks out there
who live in a two-income family, and that is kind of the way it goes
now.88 If anything happens to either wage-earning member of this
family unit, then disaster happens to the family. It can be divorce,
where suddenly you have to pay two rents instead of one; it could be
that Mom loses a job, Dad loses a job, Mom gets downsized, or Dad
gets downsized; it could be a medical problem where the medical costs
87. Using bankruptcy figures for the twelve months ending in June 1997 and popu-
lation figures revised as of July 1997, the ratio of citizens to bankruptcy filings in
Tennessee was 100:1, and in Alabama it was 124:1. See Bureau of the Census, supra
note 1.
88. See McNeil, supra note 58, at 5 tbl.1.
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have escalated dramatically; it could even be retirement. Any of these
things can wreak financial havoc on a family.
As I said, I see 500 cases a month on a regular basis, and I sit across
the table and look into the eyes of the people who are filing the bank-
ruptcy. So I see a lot of things.
I see people who have made credit decisions that make no sense.
For example, I see somebody who has financed an automobile and
committed to payments of one-half of his family's available disposable
income-and GMAC was delighted to do that. This is someone who
was actually willing to buy that car and devote half of his available
income to it when they were barely making ends meet as it was.
I see people who have truly the capacity to make some repayment
on debt using bankruptcy not to repay that debt. They think it is
much easier to not pay than to pay using bankruptcy to achieve that
goal.
I see people who are playing the system. I see people who are gam-
bling that they will not be caught by a system that handles a lot of
paper. Alternatively, they are gambling with the idea that if they do
get caught, they can fix it at essentially no charge. I think Judge Jones
has mentioned that, too.89
I see something that saddens me as an attorney. I see lawyers who
are just too lazy or too untrained to provide full debt repayment
assistance and counseling.
I see non-attorney typing services-who are arguably filling some
need-misleading truly well-intentioned people to make one of the
biggest mistakes they are going to make in their lives.
I also see, however, an elderly couple that is unable to cope with
escalating medical costs but is desperate to keep the home that they
have had for years.
I see a young couple fresh from an incredible credit frenzy, which
you can call the idea of going out and using plastic like there is no
tomorrow. They are now ready to face the music, and want to face the
music.
I see an entrepreneur-and I see a lot of these, too-whose well-
intentioned but totally misguided business plan failed, leaving him
with bank debt or SBA debt or farmers' home debt.
I see a self-employed mechanic who is trying to come out from the
underground and figure out a way to pay the taxes that he hasn't paid
for the past three or four years. He just did not have the money, so he
did not file the return.
I see divorcees-people who are now single parents trying to raise
two kids. They have a limited income and they only have limited child
89. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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support. They just are not getting the child support. It is not being
collected.
What do we do as a society when we are faced with these two com-
peting elements? Do we as members of the legal profession have a
responsibility to deal with this? How do we deal with what Professor
Gross has called failure-in one form or another, failure?
I like to use a metaphor on occasion, particularly when I talk to
creditors' groups about the bankruptcy system. I remind them that
the bankruptcy system that we have in this country provides the steam
valve on a pressure cooker of consumer debt. It is the release valve.
To take this metaphor as far as I possibly can, do we have the level
set on this pressure valve too low? Do we have the pressure valve set
too high? How can we help those who truly need the help while not
giving what is turning out to be a fairly expensive free ride to those
who do not?
This discussion we are having here today is an incredibly opportune
one because we have met on what some would call the battlefield-
although I like to call it the debating field-of where we are going as a
society on bankruptcy.
I think that you are going to hear people talk about the creditor bill,
McCollum's bill 9-maybe I can talk about that-that the credit in-
dustry has apparently drafted. You have already heard Judge Jones
talk about the majority and the minority views on the Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission as it deals with consumer credit and the bankruptcy
consumer system.91
It is an opportune time to figure out where we are going from here.
It is an interesting point, and it is one that deserves some serious
thought. I challenge you that it deserves thought as members of the
legal society because I submit to you that, as legal professionals, we
have in many ways let down the clients and legal system that we are
pledged to serve. This is a good opportunity for us to be able to reex-
amine those priorities and where we go from here.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Mr. Hildebrand. We
do hope to return to some of the introductions that you gave and
some of the problems that you raised.
Our final speaker is Michael McEneney.
MR. McENENEY: Thank you, Professor.
Given the people that I represent-mainly financial institutions-I
am sure that there are no doubts as to what my perspective is. What I
thought I would do is just quickly run through some of the debate on
the causes of consumer bankruptcy, in particular the popular miscon-
ception that credit availability is the central cause, and then talk about
90. See Responsible Borrower Protection Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997).
91. See supra notes 25-56 and accompanying text.
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some of the things that might be done to address what I think is a
fundamental problem with the Bankruptcy Code today.
Hank has run through a number of different causes of consumer
bankruptcy that he sees. For at least the last two years, there has been
considerable debate on this topic. It has been carried out before the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission,12 it has been carried out in
the press, and it has also been a debate that has taken place in aca-
demic circles. With two years of debate, you would think that there
were some definitive conclusions that one might reach on the subject,
but instead what we've got is a lot of different theories as to what
causes consumer bankruptcies.
Some say it is caused by too much credit.93 Others say it is declining
income.9 4 Still others would point to what is perceived to be a declin-
ing stigma associated with bankruptcy that decreases the threshold
that people must step over to go ahead and file a bankruptcy case.9S
There is a recent research paper that suggest that the rise in bank-
ruptcies is closely correlated to a lot of different significant life events,
such as divorce, medical problems, being involved in an automobile
accident with insufficient insurance, and similar events.96
Still others would point to lawyer advertising and suggest that as
attorneys have become more aggressive in advertising their services in
connection with debt restructuring, that the rate of bankruptcy has
gone up.97
Probably the only thing that is clear as a result of all this debate is
that bankruptcy is a complex problem and there is no single cause of
the rise in consumer bankruptcies.
As I indicated, some have suggested that the major cause is too
much credit card debt.98 Proponents of this theory often cite the
proliferation of pre-approved credit card solicitations that we all re-
ceive in the mail.99 They claim that these pre-approved credit card
offers are sent without regard for a consumer's ability to repay."w
That is simply not true.
These pre-approved solicitations are sent out based on a process
known as pre-screening. Now, pre-screening is a highly sophisticated
92. See Report, supra note 19, at 65-74.
93. American Bankr. Inst., Legislative Update, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Oct. 1996, at 6,
6, 33.
94. See id. at 33.
95. See White, supra note 62, at 211.
96. See Warren, supra note 24, at 1084 (observing that some individuals may carry
high, manageable debt until a crisis breaks the metaphorical spine of the camel).
97. See White, supra note 62, at 211.
98. See id.; see also Ausubel, supra note 6, at 250 (noting the "astonishing[ly]
high[ ]" correlation between the rise in credit card defaults and consumer
bankruptcies).
99. See Snow, supra note 9, at 65-66.
100. See Warren, supra note 24, at 1098-99 (discussing how credit purveyors are
soliciting individuals who are low in the U.S. economic strata).
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credit underwriting technique used by card issuers and other con-
sumer lenders. I will just run you through the process in general
terms.
A card issuer, for example, will identify all of the creditworthiness
characteristics that the card issuer believes a consumer must meet in
order to qualify for a particular credit offer. The issuer will provide
that information to a credit bureau, typically one of the "big three"
bureaus-Equifax, Experian, or TRW-and ask the credit bureau for
a list of all the consumers that meet those criteria. In essence, pre-
screening is very much like the underwriting process that would take
place if the consumer applied for the credit-in other words, initiated
the credit application. The only real difference is that the underwrit-
ing process takes place before the solicitation goes out. So pre-ap-
proved offers are not offers that are made arbitrarily. They are made
on the basis of a sophisticated underwriting process known as pre-
screening.
Proponents of the "too much credit" theory would take the argu-
ment to the next level and say, "Well okay, even where consumer
lenders use underwriting standards, those underwriting standards are
too lax."1 1 I believe that the facts suggest that this also is not true.
The credit standards being used today actually are highly successful
in identifying creditworthy consumers. Let's just take a look at the
bank card industry, which is comprised of the 6000 or so financial in-
stitutions that issue MasterCard and Visa cards. Only 1% of all of
those accounts end up in bankruptcy. An additional 2% or 3% of
those accounts end up being written off for other reasons; sometimes
it approaches 4%. The bottom line is that the industry is successful at
least 96% of the time. Ninety-six percent of bank card accounts pay
as agreed. It is hard to say that credit standards are too lax when the
industry is getting it right 96% of the time.
There are limits, however, on the usefulness of underwriting as a
tool to identify consumers who may declare bankruptcy. In fact,
stricter credit standards will never fully address the bankruptcy prob-
lem, and there are a number of reasons for this.
One is that more and more consumers who end up in bankruptcy
look just like a much larger number of consumers who do not. Their
financial profiles are virtually identical. This problem is compounded
by the fact that there has recently been a phenomenon known as the
"surprise bankruptcy."10 2 This is a situation where a consumer is cur-
rent on his or her account and the first indication that the lender gets
that the consumer is in financial difficulty is when the bankruptcy no-
101. See AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Chinchilla (In re Chinchilla), 202
B.R. 1010, 1015-16 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (criticizing AT&T for targeting unsolicited
credit towards consumers who could afford to pay the minimum payment terms but
were already overextended on their credit).
102. See Braucher, supra note 80, at 6.
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tice arrives. This is, believe it or not, increasingly becoming a
problem.
The bottom line is there is really no way to significantly reduce
bankruptcies through underwriting without denying credit to even
more people who would never go bankrupt. In other words, because
the financial profiles of those who end up in bankruptcy look just like
the financial profiles of a much larger number of people who are go-
ing to continue to pay their debts, you cannot underwrite to resolve
the bankruptcy problem unless you are willing to just deny credit to
the much larger number of people who are going to pay their bills.
So how do we address the consumer bankruptcy problem? I think
that the way to address the problem is to look at the Code itself.
First, let me say that when we take a look at the bankruptcy system
today, you have already heard Professor Felsenfeld mention that more
than a million consumers used the Consumer Bankruptcy Code in
1996 and even more are expected to use it in 1997.103 In fact, there
are estimates that suggest that consumer bankruptcy in 1997 will cost
$40 billion.1 4 That is $400 per U.S. household.105
It is remarkable that although we are talking about a system that
generates those kind of costs, there is no test to determine whether or
not an individual gets bankruptcy. It is like a criminal justice system
where we have the presumption of innocence, except the only one we
ask as to whether they are innocent or guilty is the debtor. There is no
adversarial process for purposes of determining whether or not the
consumer really needs bankruptcy relief. The consumer simply signi-
fies their desire to have it and, in the overwhelming majority of cases,
gets it by filing for bankruptcy.
Let's say that a consumer is in financial difficulty; the consumer
finds that he cannot repay 60% of his unsecured debts on a monthly
basis but can pay 40%. If the debtor chooses Chapter 7, he will get
100% of those debts wiped out, even though he only needed protec-
tion with respect to the 60% payments he could not make. Seventy
percent of debtors choose Chapter 7.
There is a provision that is being considered on Capitol Hill on the
House side now, as part of a bill that was introduced in the last week
and a half or so, that would establish a needs-based test to determine
how much relief a consumer gets in bankruptcy. 1" We refer to it as
the "needs-based bankruptcy approach."
103. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
104. But see Gary Klein, National Consumer Law Ctr., Consumer Bankruptcy in
the Balance: Providing an Effective Safety Net for Overwhelmed Families (written
testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Regulatory Relief,
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Feb. 11, 1998) (criticizing this
figure), available in 1998 WL 8992212.
105. See id.
106. See Responsible Borrower Protection Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997).
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The purpose, I think, is relatively non-controversial. It is to provide
bankruptcy relief based on need-in my example, to make sure that
the debtor who cannot repay 60% of his debts gets protection and is
able to stave off the creditors with respect to that 60%, but also to
make sure that he is required to continue to pay that 40% payments
that the debtor can make. In other words, the debtor does not arbi-
trarily get 100% relief when the debtor simply needs 60% relief.
There has been a lot of debate about how this system ought to
work. One of the keys that the proponents of this system have identi-
fied is that it has to be simple, it has to be easy to administer, and it
cannot place any additional significant burdens on the participants in
the bankruptcy system.
In addition, it has been made clear that the system cannot have an
impact on people whose incomes are so low that in all likelihood they
will never have the ability to repay their debts, and those individuals
ought to be able to choose Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 as they see fit.
The way this is addressed in the bill is by establishing an income
cut-off. 10 7 The income cut-off would be 75% of the national median
income for that debtor's family size. 108 That threshold would range
from about $21,000 up to about $37,000. Debtors with income below
that 75% threshold would be free to select Chapter 7 or 13, as the
debtor saw fit.10 9
Debtors that meet the threshold test would have to go through a
simple calculation that is part of the bankruptcy filing process. That
calculation would be as follows: you take the debtor's monthly in-
come, back out monthly living expenses-and those would be based
on numbers that the IRS uses to determine how much income a
debtor has available to repay back taxes-you back out from that
100% of the monthly payments for secured debts, 100% of monthly
payments for priority unsecured debts like back taxes and past-due
child support, and come up with monthly income available for non-
priority unsecured debts." 0
The test is a pretty conservative one: if the debtor has monthly in-
come available to pay unsecured debt sufficient to allow the debtor to
pay 20% of the balance of unsecured debt over a five-year repayment
plan, the debtor cannot file for Chapter 7.1'1 That debtor has suffi-
cient income to enter into a meaningful Chapter 13 repayment plan,
and if that debtor then chooses bankruptcy, he would be required to
do so.
107. See id. § 101.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. §101(3)(C).
1. See id.
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That is, in a nutshell, the needs-based test, which is the cornerstone,
I think, of, in particular, the credit-granting industry's approach to re-
forming consumer bankruptcy.
As a number of previous speakers have pointed out, however, there
is really a need to make sure that the system is balanced. This ap-
proach attempts to balance, not just between debtors in bankruptcy
and creditors impacted by bankruptcy, but it also brings into the de-
bate-and I think appropriately-the debtors who pay for bank-
ruptcy. Those are the debtors who do not declare bankruptcy but
continue to pay their debts. And again, when we have a bankruptcy
system that generates about $40 billion in costs, as is anticipated for
1997, the price that we all pay-everyone that pays their debts pays-
is pretty significant.
We view the needs-based bankruptcy approach as not controversial.
Again, it simply identifies the debtor's need for bankruptcy relief and
makes sure that that debtors get the relief they need and they do not
just arbitrarily get more. I think when we get into the debate that we
will find that others do find it controversial.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Michael.
I would like to get some ideas before the panel about the place of
bankruptcy in the system. Bankruptcy has grown, debt has grown,
and default has grown; they have all grown. I would like to open this
with the question of whether they have grown in proportion. That is,
can bankruptcy be justified because of the increase in debt; or can
bankruptcy be justified because of the increase in default?
Alternatively, has bankruptcy increased far beyond those most ob-
vious measures, which says to us that there is something else that must
be looked at? Or have I worded the question all wrong? What do
you say to that, Jane?
MS. McNAMARA: What we see-and again, it is a limited seg-
ment of the market-is that bankruptcies are increasing, but not nec-
essarily because that need is there. Installment debt continues to rise
on an annual basis and people are expanding their lifestyle through
the use of consumer debt. We are seeing the two-income households
who find it more difficult to live; and the women who do not receive
child support; the men who have to pay it but then get into a new
family and there are new obligations-those kinds of things.
If we really look at how many consumers have an "actual" need,
however, to file bankruptcy, I think it is much, much smaller than the
numbers we are seeing.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Can I pick up on that? When I went to
Legal Aid, a client came in and he owed five creditors in the aggregate
$3000, and at that moment, he was unemployed. He was a middle-
class person when employed but was then unemployed. I said to him,
"Why would you file for bankruptcy? Let's work it out with your
creditors."
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I went to the head of the Legal Aid office, Mort Dicker, and I said,
"There is no reason for this person to file bankruptcy. Why ratchet up
a system that costs $175 for someone who owes five people $3000?" I
said, "I want to do an out-of-court workout. I used to do it in law
practice all the time. I mean, I could call up a bank and we would sit
around a table."
Mort starts laughing-he is practically falling off his chair. He says,
"Go ahead, try it."
So I did, extremely unsuccessfully. I could not do it. I mean, I
could not get five creditors to agree that this person should be able to
not go into bankruptcy. I kept saying, "If he goes into bankruptcy,
you will get zero. If we work out a year-long repayment program
where you forego interest and penalties, over a year, you will get a
third to a half of what you are owed. I mean, it's a win/win situation
for everybody. And, indeed, the $175 that would go to the bankruptcy
system would go to all of you also."
I could not do it. It was astounding to me that I could call up a
bank for a corporate client and nobody would ever say to me, "Do
you have authority to speak for your client?" I called every bank in-
volved here and, to a one, they all said to me, "I'm sorry, we cannot
speak to you."
I did try getting him credit counseling, but in New York-this may
have been prior to your opening all your offices, Jane-there was a
two-to-three-month waiting period. So, to be fair, neither consumer
credit counseling nor a workout worked, which left one option: bank-
ruptcy. Thus, bankruptcy involves a number of people whom one
would think could have their problems resolved in a way other than
bankruptcy.
So, when you talk about bankruptcy filing numbers, I think you
have to back-end out a number of cases that, were people more flexi-
ble and willing, could be resolved in a different way.
Now, the good side of this little story is that a number of major
creditors have agreed to start a pilot project here through the Legal
Aid office to see if some of these smaller cases could be resolved
outside the bankruptcy system.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Let me return to my question,
Karen. You have pointed out an unfortunate situation where credi-
tors seem to have acted in an almost irresponsible manner. But my
question really was at movement. My question was: Has bankruptcy
expanded beyond the expansions in those other fields? Your illustra-
tion was directed to a stable situation, and it could just as well have
existed last year as this year. So I ask again. Bankruptcy has gotten
much worse. Has it gotten worse on a proportionate basis, more than
the increase in debt and more than the increase in debt default? Hank
is nodding "No."
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MR. HILDEBRAND: One of the benefits of the Review Commis-
sion experience has been the amount of very thoughtful and scholarly
work that has come to light and has been shared, and I commend the
Commission for that.
There were two studies that came out, that found that only one fac-
tor correlates with the increase in bankruptcy filings: debt load. That
is one of the basic conclusions of the Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
book after looking at myriad of things in three districts, albeit from
1981 data. They said, "The only thing we can find out is people who
file bankruptcy have more debts than anybody else. That is the only
correlation that we've got. 11 2 There was also a University of Mary-
land study-I guess it was the Congressional Budget Office study-
that said, "The only correlation that we can find is debt load."" 3
JUDGE JONES: I would like to put a few qualifications on that.
None of the experts is willing to say that debt causes bankruptcy, ex-
cept for Professor Ausubel.1 4
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York published a study, which
unfortunately was not presented to our Commission in public session,
where they concluded that the rates of defaults and the rates of credit
card debt were not correlated with the number of bankruptcies per se
for several reasons.
Their best explanation-and this was published earlier this year-
was that, in part, the population is borrowing more because, as you
saw from Ms. McNamara's statistics, people between the ages of thirty
and fifty are in the maximum spending years of their lives. They are
buying houses, they are putting kids through school, they are trying to
save for retirement, and they are in a position where more of them
demographically are filing. In other words, it is us, the "Baby Boom"
generation, that are the borrowers in society.
The other thing they said, interestingly, was that filing seemed to
correlate with increased wealth and the increased optimism and ex-
pectations. So, for whatever that is worth, that is another view.
My own opinion, from having sat through all these sessions, is that
it is plain to me that a lot of people are filing bankruptcy. It has to be
a middle-class phenomenon now, because you do not go from 800,000
to 50% 60% more filings in two years, supposedly the most prosper-
ous in American history, without including the people who are sup-
posed to be prosperous. I recognize there is the fiat real income,1 s
112. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and
Consumer Credit in America (1989).
113. See Crisis in Consumer Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 32, 39-
44 (1997) (statement of Kim Kowalewski, Chief, Financial and General
Macroeconomic Analysis Unit, Congressional Budget Office).
114. See Ausubel, supra note 6.
115. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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and certainly we are all bearing a higher tax burden and so on, but you
just do not explain a 50% bump in two years by saying that there is
that much more debt, because those statistics do not correlate.
MR. McENENEY: Right. In fact, the studies that have found a
correlation between debt load and write-offs principally focused on
debt load and write-offs and whether there was a correlation there,
without looking at other possible factors. I think some of the more
comprehensive studies clearly show that there are a lot of factors that
are correlated with increased bankruptcies. I mentioned a few of
them earlier.
There is an SMR study that shows that in states that have no
mandatory auto insurance that the filing rate is higher.' 1 6 That makes
some sense. People who get involved in automobile accidents without
adequate insurance may end up with debts that are much higher than
those they can handle. States where the divorce rate is higher seem to
be correlated with higher incidence of bankruptcy filing. The list goes
on and on.
The other thing I would point out, though, is the one thing we do
know is that something has changed out there in terms of the behavior
of consumers and when they choose bankruptcy, and that is a lot of
consumers with the financial profiles that for years and years indi-
cated they were good credit risks are now declaring bankruptcy.' 17 I
talked about the surprise bankruptcy, where a consumer has been
paying their debts faithfully for years-five, seven years-suddenly
goes from a current account to a bankrupt account. That is a change
in behavior out there that is recent and that has really intensified in
the last couple of years." 8
PROFESSOR GROSS: Let me pick up on what Mike was saying.
Everybody is looking for an answer, a thing, and I do not think there
is a thing. I think we ought to stop looking for the answer as to why
filing rates are going up. I do not think there is an answer.
Aside from the kinds of factors that you are describing, there is also
another factor that has not been quantified: creditor harassment of
debtors who are not in default in any meaningful way. I mean, cer-
tainly debtor behavior in part accounts for it, but so does creditor
behavior.
JUDGE JONES: I have to take issue with that, Karen, because
there has always been creditor harassment. If anything, with the ad-
116. See Mike Williams, Money & More: When There's Nothing Left, There'll Be
More of It in Fla., Atlanta J., May 3, 1998, at H3 (discussing SMR Research Corp.,
Personal Bankruptcy Crisis, 1997 (1997), which draws a correlation between states
that lack mandatory automobile insurance and high bankruptcy rates).
117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (mentioning the phenomenon of
"surprise bankruptcies").
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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vent of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 119 various truth in
lending acts, 2 ' and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act in Texas and
many other states,'2' that problem should be declining. You have all
these legal remedies and you ought to be able to ascertain a connec-
tion between more of those lawsuits being filed and declining creditor
harassment.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Let me try to explain it this way. For me,
what is causing bankruptcy is like the kids' game Jenga, where you
piece together those wooden blocks, which are all the causes. Lots of
things go on in life, including creditor behavior, debtor behavior, loss
of job, all of those things. At one point, if you just pull the wrong one
out, the thing collapses. That is what causes bankruptcy.
The point is that you do not know which one will get pulled at any
given point in time. There are lots of factors existing in people's lives.
What pulls down the house-the Jenga structure-in any given case is
a different little piece, which is why what is important, it seems to me,
is acknowledging that it is all intertwined.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Let's accept that, for the time be-
ing anyway. There is always the cop-out of saying that more research
needs to be done, and maybe more research does need to be done, but
we are only going to be here a matter of minutes now, so we are not
going to do it today.
Let me ask Hank: As bankruptcy is being used more and more, do
you think part of this mix is the discovery by the bar of things that
bankruptcy can do that the bar was largely unaware of as recently as
two or three years ago?
MR. HILDEBRAND: Who would have thought that bankruptcy
would be used as a financial planning tool? Who would have thought
that Texaco would file bankruptcy as a financial planning tool?'12
JUDGE JONES: Well, in 1984 a prominent Chapter 11 lawyer in
Texas called it a financial planning tool for companies.
MR. HILDEBRAND: Right. Start with the idea that companies
are going to go to their law firms and say: "We've got a problem. We
have manufactured a product which we no longer make"-and it was
asbestos, or it was silicon, or it was a small airplane-
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: It was a negligence prospect.
MR. HILDEBRAND: -something. "But we do not do it any-
more. And we are making money now, but we know that these per-
sonal injury actions are going to just kill this company. Ve owe it to
the stockholders to do some kind of planning now to address that."
119. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 91 Stat. 874 (1968).
120. See, e.g., id.
121. See, eg., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.30-.63 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998).
122. See Texaco, Inc. v. Wolverine Exploration Co. (In re Texaco, Inc.), 218 B.R. 1
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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At which point the lawyer in the law firm is going to sit and talk a few
times with the corporate counsel, and then they will pull in the bank-
ruptcy lawyer. The bankruptcy lawyer says, "You know, there is a
scenario that you can use here. It is going to take a little effort, it is
going to be painful, it is going to be hard, but we can use this as a
tool."
I had a client that was making money with dance clubs, but they had
committed to some terrible leases. What did they do? They filed
bankruptcy to get out from the leases.
So I suggest that perhaps here it is not so unreasonable to assume
that this kind of thought strategy is going to flow downward from the
large law firm Chapter 11 lawyers down to the consumer debtor attor-
neys that are saying, "This is a meaningful financial tool." Is that
right? I do not think so, and that is certainly not the way I was raised,
but that is what is happening. So is it appropriate? I do not know.
But is it happening? Yes, sure.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Karen, what do you think?
PROFESSOR GROSS: For me, there is a difference between
phrasing it as a moral question-"this is not how I was raised"-ver-
sus "is there something wrong with lawyers counseling their clients as
to options that are available under the law?"
One thing is clear to me: if it is right for Texaco, it is right for indi-
viduals.'23 I mean, it cannot be that it is right for Texaco but wrong
for individuals. We cannot have it such that somehow it is okay for
corporations to go out of business but it is not okay for individuals to
discharge their debts. Whatever justification we want to make for dif-
ferent treatment of individuals and corporations, it seems to me that
our response to their failure cannot be that different.
Do I see something wrong with lawyers advising their clients as to
options that are available under existing law? No.
MR. McENENEY: I think that avoids the main point, though. I
mean, I think that everyone would agree that someone in financial
difficulty ought to take a look at his options, and I would argue that
somebody certainly ought to look at consumer credit counseling
pretty closely before choosing the bankruptcy option. Once in bank-
ruptcy, however, federal law allows consumers to take 100% relief
even if they only need 50% or 40% relief.
I agree that we should not talk about whether it is a moral issue.
Instead, let's talk about what is appropriate for a federal law to do,
and whether a federal law should be arbitrarily providing billions of
dollars of relief without ever asking the people that receive it whether
they need it.
123. See Texaco, Inc. v. Wolverine Exploration Co. (In re Texaco, Inc.), 218 B.R. 1
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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JUDGE JONES: I would like to inject the moral issue here be-
cause I do think that it is a very important matter of personal integrity
and honor not to take on obligations beyond one's means and if one
has been caught in a bind to make every effort to pay them back.
There is a lot of appeal in the kinds of stories that Hank relates about
the people who have fallen on hard times, or that Karen talks about of
debtors being harassed, and that sort of thing.
We have to remember, however, that we are dealing with a system
that purports to dispense justice throughout society, and there are two
components to that. In bankruptcy, not only do you have to look at
what is happening to the person who has chosen to break their con-
tracts and default on all of their obligations, something for which we
normally have lawsuits as the remedy, but also you have to look at the
people who have taken the high road. The latter are people who, as
Mike says and a lot of our data before the Commission suggest, are in
not that different a position from the ones who defaulted. They, how-
ever, are paying back their debts, struggling to make ends meet, put-
ting their children to work to share the expenses or the costs of going
to school, and so on.
Every time someone goes bankrupt, those other people are paying
more on their debts. If too many people go bankrupt, those people
are not going to have access to credit at all anymore. Is that fair? Is
that just? Is that moral? I do think, at bottom, you've got to look at it
that way.
PROFESSOR GROSS: I think maybe we were talking about dif-
ferent moral issues. I was talking about my moral upbringing.
JUDGE JONES: Well, my moral upbringing suggests to me that
what is good for me as a moral person has to be applied to everybody
across the board as the standard. You can create deviations, but
you've got to remember the moral impact on society as a whole, too.
PROFESSOR GROSS: That is where I differ. It seems to me that
the ability to file a Chapter 7, to have a system that recognizes that
people fail and forgives them, is essential. Individuals' personal moral
codes can dictate behavior as to how people believe they themselves
should act, but that is very different than making any particular moral
code the law.
JUDGE JONES: Well, I am not going to speed above seventy-five
or eighty miles an hour, but I have no problem with there being speed
limits in society; and if I get caught, I am going to pay the penalty.
PROFESSOR GROSS: I want to set aside speeding, which seems
to me to be something of a different sort of wrong than breaching
one's contracts. Go back to contracts. One of the essential features of
contract law is that, not only can you breach but there is no penalty
for breach. One of the essences of American contract law is there are
no punitive damages, except in extraordinarily rare circumstances, for
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contract breach. That is what distinguishes contracts from tort or
criminal law.
In fact, that is an interesting segue into bankruptcy because the
heart of contract law actually is that you are permitted to breach.
MR. McENENEY: Karen, going back to something you said about
the need or desirability for preserving a system that allows someone to
take a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and obtain a discharge, do you mean that
they ought to be able to obtain a discharge even for debts that they
clearly can repay? I mean, is that an essential component of a fair and
just bankruptcy system in your view? Because what we have tried to
do is to argue: "Look, if consumers want to choose bankruptcy relief,
we are not going to preclude them from doing so; but once they
choose it, they should be treated in a way that is fair not only to them,
by giving them the relief that they can demonstrate they need, but also
is fair to everyone else who pays for their relief."
And so, to go back to my example, if the debtor cannot make 60%
of his monthly payments, he gets relief on the 60% but he continues to
devote future income to the 40% he can pay.
PROFESSOR GROSS: There are lots of reasons why I do not be-
lieve in needs-based or means-based testing in terms of access. I guess
my simple answer is: yes, I do believe there are debtors who should
be permitted to file Chapter 7 even if they could repay their creditors
in a Chapter 13. We have obviously a disagreement as to that issue.
But that is not to say that I do not believe in ferreting out abuses. I
would just do that differently than you would. In other words, there
should be certain debts that are non-dischargeable; I do believe that.
I also believe that to the extent that we can-within reason-deter-
mine who are the bad actor debtors who are committing fraud, we
should also ferret them out. It is not that I am suggesting we have a
system plagued by people who are abusers in the fraud sense-we
may be talking about different definitions of abusers.
MR. McENENEY: I would not even necessarily call these people
abusers. I mean, the Code today allows them to take that 100% relief
even if they need something less. So I do not know if that is abuse. I
think it is a problem with the law, and I think that if the law stays the
way it is that we've got to recognize that there is a fairness or equity
issue, because creditors, for one, will have to take steps. As more and
more people become-aware of the Bankruptcy Code and use it-you
know, every indication is that the number of filings in the consumer
area is going to continue to go up-the cost will be passed on to other
consumers. There is a question as to whether it is fair to do that if the
consumer does not need all the relief in bankruptcy that the consumer
is taking.
Just as importantly, creditors have been tightening credit standards,
and if consumer bankruptcies continue to proliferate, they will only
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continue to do that. 24 As I pointed out, that is going to restrict credit
to a whole group of people who clearly can repay, and will repay, to
try to ferret out those who declare bankruptcy. That impacts most
significantly lower and moderate income families who have the fewest
alternatives for financing available to them.
So we certainly, I think, understand the need to make sure that peo-
ple in financial difficulty have a way out, but I think the real question
is whether it can be calibrated in a way so they get the relief they need
and do not unnecessarily create costs and other problems for people
who pay for it.
PROFESSOR GROSS: But, you would also have to agree that
even in the best of all systems, we redistribute wealth. There will al-
ways be some way that some people use services or partake of bene-
fits of a system that the rest of us pay for.
MR. McENENEY: Absolutely.
PROFESSOR GROSS: And that is sort of a price we pay to live in
a civilized society. The question is: How much are we willing to pay
to live in this civilized world?
MR. KILDEBRAND: I think you are talking about an issue where
Karen is mentioning that there should be an election and Michael is
mentioning it should be mandated. I come from a district in which
most of the bankruptcy filings are Chapter 13.
To give you just my myopic statistics here, of the cases that reach
completion-and we have in excess of 40% completion rate, which is
higher than the national average; about 44.5% complete and reach
discharge-of the cases that complete in Nashville, they get a dis-
charge; 50% of those cases paid 100% of the debts back. The average
distribution in all cases that reached a completion was 69.5% of distri-
bution for unsecured claims.
That may not be typical, but the point is that there was an election
made by the folks there, not mandated by the law, to pay as much as
possible. They have perceived a reward. I do not know why.
I ask many people sometimes who are seeking to pay their debts
back across the table from me why they do not just do a Chapter 7,
because clearly all they have is unsecured debt; they are not trying to
keep a house, they are not trying to keep a car. The answer is, "This is
the election I have made, this is what I want to do. I feel a necessity to
do it. I want to do it." Some of them are misled to believe that I am
going to improve their credit rating. I try and improve their credit
rating.
PROFESSOR GROSS: And they should have it improved if they
do that.
124. See Snow, supra note 9, at 66 ("Not surprisingly, consumer defaults have also
risen close to record rates, resulting in well-publicized concern by many high-risk
lenders and a tightening of lending standards.").
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MR. HILDEBRAND: They should. I try to do that. We are work-
ing on that, and I think everybody at this table right here is working
toward that goal, so I do not think there is a disagreement with that.
MR. McENENEY: I would just point out, Hank, there is a corol-
lary to your story about election. All those debtors that paid 100% or
69% could have elected under the Bankruptcy Code to pay zero-
MR. HILDEBRAND: That is correct.
MR. McENENEY: -and file for Chapter 7. I think that there is
evidence that many consumers are doing just that. They are filing for
Chapter 7, taking 100% relief, when they do not need it all.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Isn't it possible the problem is not that
debtors have a choice-a choice that, I believe, is critical to our sys-
tem? The question is: Why aren't there better incentives in place for
those who complete a Chapter 13? Maybe that is where we should be
putting our attention.
JUDGE JONES: I have two observations about this. One is that
nationwide only about a third of Chapter 13 debtors complete their
plans. So if you look at the bankruptcy system in terms of "success"
and compare it to the "success" in the underwriting of the credit card
lenders, I would say the bankruptcy system has a long way to go. I
think there is a lot to be drawn from that comparison.
But second, about the benefits of Chapter 13, we have truly strug-
gled to try and figure out how you could confer benefits on Chapter 13
sufficiently to make it attractive. The only things that I think we came
up with over the course of the Commission's discussion were:
Enhance the super discharge-which I think is highly problematic
because, to me, the super discharge only protects malefactors and they
are a very small proportion of the Chapter 13 users.1z5
Provide an improved credit rating report, which I think is very im-
portant-but it only goes so far, because everybody can get access to
post-bankruptcy credit now, and you can get it faster after a Chapter 7
than after a Chapter 13.
That leaves by default the "dog that didn't bark" in our Commis-
sion, which is a requirement of certain debtors to file Chapter 13. We
never really took that on as seriously as we should have.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Karen, one sentence in your book
that startled me was a suggestion you made that perhaps there were
too many Chapter 13s. l1 6 Do you still believe that?
PROFESSOR GROSS: Yes. That is, however, because I believe
that there is a problem in how debtors are making their Chapter
choices. You see, it is a little unusual that Chapter 13s seem clustered
in certain areas of the United States and not in others. It seems un-
125. See Report, supra note 19, § 1.5.7-.9, at 103.
126. See Gross, supra note 16, at 119 ("It may be that too many debtors use Chap-
ter 13, and the success of this chapter is worthy of debate.").
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clear to me that why debtors are making certain choices. There may
be some problem in the advice debtors are getting and the quality of
that advice, and the quality of that advice may vary across the United
States. Now, some debtors are very well represented and very well
counseled, but others are not.
It is also important to note that the numbers are a little off when
you talk about how many people fie Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13,
because we only count Chapter 13s as one filing, even when filed by a
couple. In fact, it is two people when they are joint. So, there are in
fact much more subtle breakdowns that you could do with the num-
bers that would increase the number of Chapter 13s because a goodly
number of those cases are joint.
If what is being suggested is, in essence, a mandatory Chapter 13,
there are a whole host of issues that that raises, although that is a
different suggestion than means-based choices.
MR. McENENEY: Yes. I just want to make it clear I think the
needs-based test in the legislation that I spoke about simply says that
if you have the income to fund a meaningful Chapter 13 plan that you
are not eligible for Chapter 7. The net result of that is that if you
choose bankruptcy, Chapter 13 is probably your only option. Obvi-
ously, 11 may be an option for certain people. But it is still the con-
sumer's choice. The only question is what is the appropriate form of
relief. And again, if the consumer can fund a meaningful repayment
plan, needs-based testing says that Chapter 13 is their only option.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Jane, any comments?
MS. McNAMARA: As the bankruptcy law has changed over the
last almost twenty years that I have been in this business, every time it
changes we see increases in the number of bankruptcy filings.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Regardless of the change?
MS. McNAMARA: Regardless of the change. In Michigan bank-
ruptcies are increasing on an annual basis 30%, and yet we have the
lowest unemployment in the state that we have had in over twenty-
five years. It does not add up. It just does not make any sense.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Well, there is one explanation.
There is an old story that I heard a long time ago about somebody
who wanted to increase worker productivity and said, "Increase the
lighting; if you increase the lighting, you will get more output." So
they increased the lighting and, sure enough, they got more output.
"That worked. Increase the fighting some more." They increased the
lighting and got more output. They increased the lighting some more
and got more output. And then they said: "Well, wait a minute. This
is not a controlled experiment. Let's see what happens if we now re-
duce the lighting." So they reduced the lighting and they got more
output.
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Could it be attention to the Bankruptcy Code rather than the na-
ture of the change that is creating some of these events?
MS. McNAMARA: It could very well be. I think the Code needs
to be tighter than what it is because I think there are people out there
who can pay their debts who elect not to. Yes, there are times when it
is a necessity, but that choice needs to be made carefully. For the
consumer who goes to a bankruptcy attorney-how do bankruptcy at-
torneys make money? By filing bankruptcies.
JUDGE JONES: Karen and I were talking about that sub rosa. I
think there is a lot to be said about the adequacy of legal advice that
people are receiving. Certainly it does appear that the choices be-
tween Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 are not always logically driven.
In Texas, for instance, we have more generous exemptions than
even the Commission proposals would permit, and you would not
think anyone would fie Chapter 13. In fact, we have a couple of dis-
tricts that have large numbers of Chapter 13s and very high success
rates with them. That is not rationally explicable.
MR. McENENEY: There is real concern, however, that as the
Bankruptcy Code gets a higher and higher profile and more people
understand the benefits of bankruptcy-i.e., that you can in a Chapter
7 case wipe out thousands, even tens of thousands, of dollars of un-
secured debt-more people who are financially strapped are going to
take that route. That is why it is so important that as bankruptcy rates
do increase that people get the appropriate relief, and not more.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Why shouldn't they access the system?
That is what it is there for. It is there for people who become over-
burdened. I think you have a big hurdle, it seems to me, to explain as
an initial matter why it would be that a company that could be produc-
tive can go out of business but an individual cannot obtain a full
discharge.
JUDGE JONES: I am the only consistent member that I know. I
would also prevent companies from taking advantage of bankruptcy
except under very narrow circumstances.127
PROFESSOR GROSS: I read your article on Chapter 11. At least
you are consistent between the individual and the consumer. There
are a number of people, however, who are not.
JUDGE JONES: I think that can be partly explained by self-inter-
est. I really do not think, however, that that is the main point here,
because if we are talking about consumer bankruptcy the fact is that a
lot of people use debt for reasons other than to put bread on the table.
127. See Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and Creditor In-
terests, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1088, 1089 (1992) (arguing that because most Chapter 11
filings result in liquidation rather than reorganization, Chapter 11 does not fulfill its
goals but merely forestalls liquidation).
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One thing that has become very plain to us in these hearings is that a
lot of people who file bankruptcy over-indulged.
When we had hearings down in Alabama, the debtors' attorneys
surrounded me and said, "Don't do away with reaffirmations," be-
cause I have been throwing out proposals like-"well, it is limited to
two per household." They said, "But you cannot do that. What about
the bass boat and what about the Skidoos?" These were the debtors'
attorneys.
In the Fifth Circuit Bankruptcy Judges Conference, I met with our
bankruptcy judges who said that they used to get surprised when a
person with $25,000 income had $25,000 or $30,000 in debt, and then it
became $50,000 in debt, and now there are people with that income
who have $100,000 in debt.
PROFESSOR GROSS: The question is: are the people rushing in
the people with the Skidoos? You see, Michael makes it sound like
everybody is rushing in to bankruptcy going, "Yippee, I get to file
bankruptcy today!" That is not what I see.
MR. McENENEY: That is not what I was suggesting. What I was
saying, though, is that there are a lot of people out there struggling,
and that as more of them become aware of the fact that bankruptcy is
a relatively easy way out, that you can eliminate in Chapter 7 tens of
thousands of dollars of debt, even if you could repay a good portion of
that, that the concern is that more people will choose that option to
resolve their financial difficulties. That is why it is so important that
as the Bankruptcy Code remains available for people to elect to use at
their choice that the relief they get only be the relief they need.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: I may be living in a dream world,
but I am beginning to think that I hear a consensus among the panel.
MR. HILDEBRAND: We are not dealing with a dream world.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Let me start with Jane and go
through the five of you and ask one question to all of you. Would you
have any objection to a Code that required somebody with surplus
income to pay a portion of the person's obligations, understanding
that there are different ways of defining surplus income and there are
different ways of determining the obligations that would be paid?
What I am suggesting is an approach very different from the Chapter
7 approach today.
Jane?
MS. McNAMARA: I am not opposed to it at all. I could tell you
stories all day long of the consumers that come to see us that are not
willing to adjust their lifestyle, or who will close out a program with us
because the check was not received promptly by the cable TV com-
pany and they are not willing to give up their cable TV.
Credit is something that is a privilege, not a right. Michael has said
several times that as more and more people file bankruptcy, the costs
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of those losses are passed on to the rest of us. That is not going to
change. As we see more and more people file, I think ultimately there
will be less access to credit for all of us because of the losses the credi-
tors incur. And yes, they build that into the cost of doing business, no
question.
Bankruptcy should be available, but it should be a last alternative. I
have used the analogy many, many times: the first time you have an
argument with your spouse you do not run out and file for divorce. It
is the same thing with bankruptcy; it is something that should be a last
alternative after you have exhausted all opportunities to repay.
Yes, there will be the need for some consumers to file bankruptcy,
there is no question. But as many as are filing? I personally do not
believe so. I think the law should be tighter.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Hank?
MR. HILDEBRAND: Do I have an objection to a Bankruptcy
Code which would require entities-debtors-who have surplus in-
come to as a condition to getting relief dedicate that income? No,
provided it is evenly applied. I am going to agree with Judge Jones-
provided it is everybody, business people and consumers.
One of the things that Mike had mentioned is if you are beyond
75% of the median income but you cannot pay 20% of your debt, you
can go ahead and do Chapter 7. So people who have greater debts
can file Chapter 7, whereas people with smaller debt cannot file a
Chapter 7; they've got to dedicate their income to a Chapter 13. I find
that kind of dichotomy problematic in that scenario.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Karen?
PROFESSOR GROSS: I do not favor a system, either for individu-
als or businesses, that mandates that income be dedicated-disposa-
ble, however you want to characterize the income-be available for
repayment to creditors.
I do think, however, that there is something which we may all agree
on-that the quality and amount and nature of information and coun-
seling that debtors get pre-bankruptcy is not necessarily optimal
across the country. I think you may get consensus on that. While
there are some very good debtor lawyers out there, the quality of in-
formation that debtors get, because many are pro se, is very question-
able. I think you would stand a greater chance of getting agreement
on that issue than this one.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Before proceeding with the rest of
the panel, what is your reason, Karen, for saying that somebody with
surplus income should not use a portion of that income to pay some
part of the creditor obligations? I am not sure that I follow.
PROFESSOR GROSS: I wrote four chapters in a book explaining
why the "fresh start" principle and the discharge in Chapter 7 is so
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significant."2 The bottom line, to condense these four chapters very
quickly, is that I believe that people fail and should be forgiven. We
live in a world in which we encourage risk-taking, and we live in a
world in which when you take risks, whether they are good risks or
bad risks, sometimes things do not work out as you want.
One of the benefits that our law provides-not every year, but
every six years, and not for those who are fraudulent-is that you can
begin again. For me, that is central to our notion of bankruptcy, it is
central to our vision of ourselves as a people, as a nation, and it is
what distinguishes us from lots of other nations across the world. It is
not something I am embarrassed about, by the way. I am very proud
of the fact that our bankruptcy system prizes its ability to recognize
failure and to deal with it.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Do we want to continue with this
question?
JUDGE JONES: You know my answer.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Yes, and I know your answer,
Mike.
PROFESSOR GROSS: How about the other one? Would you
agree on the other one, though, about better counseling?
MR. McENENEY: Pre-bankruptcy counseling.
JUDGE JONES: I think the Commission agreed on that.12 9 I do
not, however, discount personal responsibility to the extent that some
people do here.
MR. McENENEY: Obviously I support a system that would
devote surplus income to repayment of debts.
On the "fresh start" point, obviously there has historically been a
lot of value placed on the fresh start. I think the way the bankruptcy
system works today, however, it fails everyone. It fails the debtor,
who files for Chapter 7, gets a discharge, and everybody seems to
agree that those debtors largely are unsophisticated financially, and it
sets them free to engage in exactly the same behavior that got them
into financial difficulty in the first place.
If you want to look at one of the significant benefits of needs-based
bankruptcy, it takes at least some of those people and, under a plan
administered by a trustee, helps them understand how they need to
change their lifestyles to manage their money.
JUDGE JONES: Is this a "Twelve Step" process for financial
repair?
MR. HILDEBRAND: It is true. Some of the more successful pro-
grams in Chapter 13, and in bankruptcy in general, have dealt with the
San Antonio process, where there is a great deal of education and
counseling that is available. Other programs are in Columbus, Ohio
128. See Gross, supra note 16, at 11-24, 91-134.
129. See Report, supra note 19, § 1.1.5, at 96.
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and the Middle District of North Carolina. I know other trustees who
are getting involved in this.
MR. McENENEY: So a fresh start that would really be meaningful
to a debtor, I think, would be one that would involve something like a
Chapter 13, where the debtor is supervised in terms of managing his
or her finances, at the same time being given the protection with re-
spect to the obligations the debtor cannot meet.
MR. HILDEBRAND: If we took and made that in some way ap-
plicable to a Chapter 7 debtor, wouldn't that be an appropriate re-
sponse? You get your discharge, you can walk away with a fresh start,
but you get some kind of an educational requirement as well?
PROFESSOR GROSS: Absolutely.
MR. McENENEY: I think education is important in either case. I
have serious reservations about the efficacy of education in a Chapter
7 context, where it is over in a relative heartbeat. I think that the
opportunities for education are much more significant in a Chapter 13.
MR. HILDEBRAND: Under the existing scenario that would be
true. But let's assume-we are sitting here creating a new Bankruptcy
Code-that until you complete your educational program in a Chap-
ter 7 you do not receive that Chapter 7 discharge-but there is no a
requirement to repay any debt.
MR. McENENEY: No. I understand that, Hank. All I am saying
is there is nothing like having someone like yourself spend three-to-
five years helping the debtor understand how the debtor needs to
budget in order to make these payments under a plan. I mean, that is
very effective education, and you cannot find that in a Chapter 7 case.
JUDGE JONES: Let me ask a historical question of our professors
about the fresh start. We did not have a bankruptcy law for a hundred
years, did we?
PROFESSOR GROSS: Our first bankruptcy law was in 1800.130
JUDGE JONES: I understand, but they only lasted two to three
years.13 1
PROFESSOR GROSS: Yes. We have had whole periods, until
1898, in which we did not have a bankruptcy law, although the history
that has been told is not a completely accurate one.' 32 For example,
many people say that our first bankruptcy law had no discharge when
in point of fact it did.
JUDGE JONES: Well, I am not making that point. I am just say-
ing the fresh start is sort of like the "wall of separation" between
130. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
131. See Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (repealing Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch.
19, 2 Stat. 19).
132. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19,
1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed
1803).
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church and state. It is a metaphor, and you've got to add content to it
and understand it very carefully in context.
MR. HILDEBRAND: Our need for a discharge has changed a lit-
tle bit. I can throw in your home state and my home state as an exam-
ple. In the early nineteenth century the equivalent of a bankruptcy
discharge was writing the word "GTI" on your door in Tennessee.
The "GTI" meant "Gone To Texas," and no one was going to follow
anybody down and go fight in the Alamo down there to go and collect
a debt. In addition, until the Second World War really, almost all of
the lending decisions were asset-based lending decisions. If you had
property, you could borrow money. If you had assets, you could bor-
row money. Then, the phenomenon that developed is the reliance on
an income stream. Now, with some of the pre-screening stuff, we may
not be relying even on your income stream or debt load; we are re-
quiring some other criteria. We are relying on something else.
Our bankruptcy law, however, is founded upon asset-based lending,
and that may be why we are in the throes of this conflict. It is an
asset-based lending solution to an income-based lending environment.
PROFESSOR GROSS: I would be happy at some point to chat
about the history of the fresh start, which I think antedates even our
bankruptcy law. I mean, we are a nation founded by debtors.
I want to talk about personal responsibility, to respond to Judge
Jones.133 I do not abdicate personal responsibility at all. You and I
may differ as to how to develop personal responsibility, and you and I
may have very different notions about how to develop it. It is not
that I do not believe in personal responsibility, by any stretch. I think
that is very important to make very clear. In fact, my book makes it
very clear that I am not saying people have no responsibility. The
question is: How do you get responsible people?
JUDGE JONES: You know, this is an argument that cuts across
every social debate in society today. How do you foster responsible
conduct in teen-agers with regard to sex? Do you tell them, "No,
don't do it"; or do you "educate" them in the hopes that they will not
get tempted by all the trash that they hear and see on TV and in the
media? Similarly, how do you teach people not to use drugs? Do you
put them in jail when they start to deal in drugs; or do you "counsel"
and treat them?
What disturbs me about this bankruptcy debate that has gone on
over the last couple of years is that many people in the bankruptcy
community are unwilling to look at it in those terms and recognize
that there are two different views of society here that we are talking
about. To be honest, I felt as if my view, which has to do with per-
sonal responsibility, was just ignored.
133. See text accompanying supra note 129.
1999] 1357
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
PROFESSOR GROSS: I do not think that is true for my debate
with you.
JUDGE JONES: I am not saying that. I would be interested in
your comments. That is just something I have found. Hank Hilde-
brand is an obvious exception to that. I think he has one of the more
refreshingly open-minded views on the whole subject.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Actually, I think the basis of my initial re-
marks here was to acknowledge that it is a world-view issue. It is a
perspectival issue that has to do with fundamental beliefs about
human nature, choice, social, economic, and political theory.
Can I just go to a point you made that education is best served in a
Chapter 13? I really disagree with that, because one of the remarka-
ble things to me is that Chapter 13, even in those areas of the country
without a formal education program, does by its nature provide some
education. You have to budget, you have to live within an agreement
for a three-to-five-year period. I mean, it does have some financial
management skills in it.
MR. McENENEY: Sure.
PROFESSOR GROSS: We have a bunch of Chapter 7 debtors who
go into the system and out of the system no better off-other than
being discharged from their debt. If you were to think about where
debtor education belongs, if you only had X dollars and only one
place to put it, give it to the Chapter 7 debtors. I do not care that they
are in the system for a short time. Do short-term intensive education,
but don't leave them out.
MR. McENENEY: I think we agree, Karen. I think, though, that
the way I would deal with the problem with Chapter 7 debtors and the
fact that they do not get educated is to shift more of them into Chap-
ter 13. That way they would get those opportunities that we both
agree are stronger and more effective than they would be in Chapter
7. At the same time I would educate those debtors that remain in
Chapter 7, but most would benefit by shifting them out of Chapter 7
into Chapter 13 at the start.
JUDGE JONES: Do the people who sponsored Representative
McCollum's bill have any estimate of the number of cases that this
would shift from Chapter 7 into Chapter 13? They must have done
something.
MR. McENENEY: Estimates vary. The one piece of research that
is out there, which is based on a slightly different model, is the re-
search that was done by Professor Jack Barron at Purdue and Mike
Staten at Georgetown.13 4 The two of them looked at a sample of
134. See John M. Barron & Michael E. Staten, Personal Bankruptcy: A Report on
Petitioners' Ability-to-Pay (Oct. 6, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor), cited in Warren, supra note 24, at 1088 n.35. This study has been harshly criti-
cized by commentators and vehemently supported by its authors. See Warren, supra
note 24. at 1091-92.
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions and found that a quarter of those peti-
tions, based on the debtors' own information, showed enough income
to repay a third of their debts.13 1 In other words, just based on taking
a look at income, backing out the living expenses-not the conserva-
tive living expenses that would be set forth in the needs-based test I
discussed, which are based on IRS numbers; but taking the debtor's
actual information where the debtor says "income is X, living ex-
penses are Y"-the remainder, according to the two professors, would
be sufficient in 25% of the cases to pay off the debtor. 36
MR. HILDEBRAND: Before you get to that level, how many peo-
ple in Chapter 7 are beyond the 75% of the median national income?
MR. McENENEY: The answer to that is I don't know. The re-
search was not based on that model. The 75% threshold is something
that Representative McCollum first floated a few days before he in-
troduced the legislation.
MR. HILDEBRAND: I am talking pure self-interest here, which is
the fact that when this bill passes, as you hope it will next year, I sup-
pose, then I now have to administer a group of cases for people who
are in Chapter 13 who do not want to be there, for one thing. I cannot
use the incentive reason anymore; I've got to use some kind of electric
prod.
MR. McENENEY: Well, actually, the incentives will be pretty
strong, because if they do not perform-if under the needs-based test
Chapter 13 is their only option-then they better pay that Chapter 13
or they are back out of bankruptcy and the stay is lifted and they have
to deal with creditors again.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Let me just say that it is interesting to me
that you make a threshold without having the data to support how
many people are impacted by it. It would seem to me that data would
have pushed you one way or the other as to how to address the prob-
lem you perceive.
MR. McENENEY: Well, I think, based on the study that I just
mentioned and the tighter standards that are in the legislation that has
been introduced, the number is below that 30% number I mentioned.
JUDGE JONES: This business about data to me is totally a red
herring. How did Congress reach the amounts of debt for the thresh-
old in Chapter 13 to begin with? They pulled them out of the air.
Why did they raise them in 1994? Well, they raised them because
debtors in California had mortgages to pay, so they raised them effec-
tively in Texas, where the mortgages are lower, bringing small busi-
nesses into Chapter 13.
135. See Barron & Staten, supra note 171, cited in Warren, supra note 24, at 1088
n.35.
136. See Barron & Staten, supra note 171, cited in Warren, supra note 24, at 1088
n.35.
1999] 1359
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
PROFESSOR GROSS: The fact that we did not do it wisely before
does not mean that we should do it equally unwisely again.
JUDGE JONES: I do not think that data are the sole criterion of
what is wise. I think that there is a principle here, and the principle is
that if you are making 75% of the American median income, you can
cover your expenses and have a little left over. That is the principle,
and I do not see anything wrong with that principle. Some people
might have the lower principle-for example, they may feel that even
the most frugal immigrant who has come over and lives hand-to-
mouth and puts money away in a shoe box should pay something
back. I do not share that view, but to me that is a logical view.
I do not see how anyone can go to the further extreme and say that
these doctors who made bad real estate deals and are earning
$250,000-$500,000 a year ought to walk away from their debts in
Chapter 7. Just picking something like that is not unfair.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Let me make an abrupt change and
try something new, which I think will lead to a very, very brief discus-
sion. There has been so much written and spoken about lenders lend-
ing too much money, lenders lending carelessly, there being an
excessive amount of credit out there, etc. Does anybody on the panel
think that there should be some form of restriction on the lenders as
to what they could lend?
MR. HILDEBRAND: A lot of this would go away if we had a
national usury law. I am convinced of that.
MR. McENENEY: So would a lot of the credit availability, Hank.
MR. HILDEBRAND: I am not necessarily advocating that, but I
think far fewer debtors would file for bankruptcy.
MR. McENENEY: That is just another side of the underwriting
issue. The bottom line is if you set up a national usury law, a lot of
people who handled credit responsibly all their lives would not have it
available to them.
PROFESSOR GROSS: Actually-people may be surprised-I do
not have a problem with the extension of credit. In fact, I think that
what is remarkable is that the credit scoring system has enabled peo-
ple who previously could not access the credit market to get credit,
and what is even more remarkable is that they are paying. So, to me,
it is not access to the credit market that is the problem. That is not to
say there aren't some frivolous lenders out there, but that, for me, is
like there are some bad actor debtors out there.
The root of the problem is not that credit card companies are ex-
tending credit extraordinarily improvidently. In fact, the flip side is
that people are getting credit who could not get it before. There are
other problems, though, like lack of monitoring. I have problems with
the credit industry, but access is not my major beef.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: And your major beef is?
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PROFESSOR GROSS: I have problems with the credit card indus-
try in two places. One is pre-bankruptcy. There is a lack of monitor-
ing of credit, and I have problems with their mechanisms and means
of dealing with debtors who cannot pay. I think are far too stringent
and do not recognize the availability of more flexible approaches to
debt repayment outside of bankruptcy. That is my pre-bankruptcy
piece.
I also have a problem on the post-bankruptcy piece. There are a
whole group of credit collection mechanisms that are now being tried
on debtors who have gotten a discharge that I think are problematic.
JUDGE JONES: With regard to the lack of monitoring, we have
gotten a lot of letters from lenders, credit unions and other lenders as
well, and there have been lots of articles now, that the number of
bankruptcies filed by people who were not in default has increased.137
That leads us to a serious question in my mind about how one com-
plains about lack of monitoring. I know there is a realm in which one
can, but that is a portentous problem.
PROFESSOR GROSS: I would agree for the ones that are the sur-
prise bankruptcies.
JUDGE JONES: That is a very fast-growing number.
PROFESSOR GROSS: It is not as big a number as one might
believe.
MR. HILDEBRAND: It is a surprising number, that almost one
out of ten, one out of twelve, would do that. I am saying that.
MR. McENENEY: The bottom line is there is a lot of monitoring
that does take place. Transaction patterns are looked at and systems
are becoming even more and more sophisticated to try and identify
consumers that look like they are on a bankruptcy track earlier and
earlier. The problem is that, for the reasons I mentioned earlier, in-
cluding surprise bankruptcies, it is really impossible with any certainty
to identify consumers and say consumer A is going to go bankrupt,
consumer B is just going to be in default for a while and come back,
and consumer C is just slow paying. There is just not a good way to do
that. I think that the lenders are trying, but there is just no perfect
system.
PROFESSOR GROSS: I do not know enough about the mechanics
of the credit scoring system to know how much more one could tell.
One thing, however, is true: If the problem is not access, then individ-
uals who get credit are not counseled as to how to use it well. There is
a problem there.
JUDGE JONES: The access is not the issue. It is the responsibility
with it and determining how much of it you can afford. Because if you
are bombarded with pre-approved credit applications and you send
137. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (discussing "surprise
bankruptcies").
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them all in and you get credit, that is not the creditors' problem. It is
up to the consumer. Unfortunately, we do not teach consumers, gen-
erally speaking, how to manage money, and so they learn the hard
way, by getting into trouble.
MR. McENENEY: Although the overwhelming majority of con-
sumers that get that credit use it wisely and do not get themselves in
trouble.
MR. HILDEBRAND: Should a credit grantor have a responsibility
for saying "you've gotten the credit; we want you to use it
responsibly?"
MR. McENENEY: Let's go back to the bank card industry statis-
tics: 1% of accounts end up in bankruptcy; an additional 2% or 3%
get written off for other reasons; 96% of the accounts are paying as
agreed.
PROFESSOR GROSS: That does not mean they know what they
are doing. That just means they are paying. That does not mean they
know how much they are paying for their washing machine. They are
paying for it, but instead of it costing $300, it costs them $700.
MR. McENENEY: It also does not mean they do not know what
they are doing. Educating 100% of consumers in fine print on disclo-
sures-or however you would accomplish that-the bottom line is it
would be costly to do if it is going to be effective. How do you justify
imposing that cost on 96% of the accounts that do not need the educa-
tion to cover the 3% or 4% that do?
PROFESSOR GROSS: In fact, your industry is doing a fair
amount of education for just the reasons that I am explaining, which is
that educated consumers who learn how to use credit well, even non-
defaulting debtors, are better customers for creditors.
MR. McENENEY: Absolutely, and I think the industry has recog-
nized that. I think you have probably seen programs that bank card
industry associations have developed for high school students and for
adults to help them manage credit wisely. I think there is a difference,
however, between that and imposing some sort of federal obligation
that makes those programs mandatory and imposes a cost on them.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Unfortunately, our time is up. I
think what I would like to do is go through the panel one last time 38
and give each member a chance to sum up and give any final observa-
tions he or she may have. Let's go through in the order that they
began a long, long time ago.
Judge Jones, you will be the first speaker.
JUDGE JONES: I think I will use this portion of my time to go
over what our dissenting report said because I really did not do that to
begin with. I think you have seen the general theme of what I learned
138. Professor Gross was unable to attend the afternoon session and, accordingly,
she was unable to make concluding remarks.
1362 [Vol. 67
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
being on the Commission, which was that the bankruptcy system that
we presently have-leave aside any question of means testing-does
not seem to me to be satisfactory. The reason it is not satisfactory is
that it lacks controls; it lacks clarity. Whenever it lacks clarity, that
causes more litigation, which drives up the transactional costs, which
ultimately means less money for debtors as well as less money for
creditors, and costs society at large because of the unwieldiness of the
system.
Given that background, our proposals were mostly in the vein of-
this is speaking for four of us-aside from the matters that we agreed
to, we had restrictions on the filing to try to clean up the problem of
inaccurate and inadequate schedules, including:
The National Registry; 139
Making discharge contingent on a trustee certificate; 4 '
Requiring debtors to submit copies of their tax returns;141
Putting the lawyer on the line with Rule 11-type responsibility for
the debtor's schedules;142
Revoking a discharge if a debtor has made material false statements
in connection with his schedules and documents filed with the bank-
ruptcy court.143
Then, to try to clarify some particular problems in the law that peo-
ple had identified before the Commission:
We suggested, as I have already said, a response to the Rash 4' case
that would have been a mid-point between wholesale and retail value
of collateral. 45
We would solve the circuit split about the so-called "installment re-
demption" option by saying that a debtor does not have that option.1 46
The debtor retains three options: to reaffirm, redeem, or surrender
collateral subject to security interests only.'47
In Chapter 13 we would require payments to be made simultane-
ously to secured and unsecured creditors for the life of the plan.'
That is also a provision in the majority recommendations. t49 The idea
139. See Jones & Shepard, Dissent, supra note 44, at 8 (Editor's note The various
dissents and commentaries in chapter five of the Report are each separately
paginated.).
140. See id at 9.
141. See id.
142. See id at 8.
143. See id. at 9.
144. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. C1. 1879 (1997).
145. See supra notes 36-36.
146. See Jones & Shepard, Dissent, supra note 44, at 10 (Editor's Note: The various
dissents and commentaries contained in chapter five of the Report are each sepa-
rately paginated.).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 11.
149. See Report, supra note 19, §§ 1.5.2-.4, at 7.
1999] 1363
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
there is to make sure that the debtors have an incentive to actually
complete the plan and make the payments to the unsecured creditors.
We would allow five-year plans specifically.15
We would have the Chapter 13 plans be reviewed annually and pay-
ments modified either up or down according to the debtor's
income. 151
We would define "default" in Chapter 13 to include a debtor miss-
ing two consecutive payments and not being able to catch up.152 Fur-
thermore, we would make it clear that if a debtor defaults in a
Chapter 13 plan all the benefits of Chapter 13 would have to be
revoked. 53
Now, this series of recommendations is open to the obvious criti-
cism that nobody would file Chapter 13 under these restrictions.
There is some truth to that. To me, that leads naturally into further
discussion of means testing; but the Commission, unfortunately, did
not reach that in any detail.
I would also, in response to the recommendations of a number of
judges, as well as lawyers, allow an affidavit practice on motions for
relief from the stay in the ordinary consumer case. That would speed
things up considerably.
We would exempt from the automatic stay residential leases. We
received 375 letters, I believe, from landlords pointing out what an
abuse occurs in regard to residential tenancies when the tenant has
gone through a foreclosure or eviction proceeding and then fies bank-
ruptcy. It costs the landlord, who is often him or herself not a person
of means, additional expense and delay in payment of rent.
We would clarify § 1322(b) 54 to say that no lien for a debt secured
principally by a debtor's homestead can be stripped down, 55 although
we took no specific position on Congressman Butler's proposal. But
that explanation of § 1322(b) would reinforce the Nobelman deci-
sion, 56 as opposed to doing away with it, as some advocated.
I have an extensive critique of the proposals the Commission's ma-
jority. I believe there will also be four votes to take a different ap-
proach to reaffirmations, which is to say that reaffirmations ought to
150. See Jones & Shepard, Dissent, supra note 44, at 11 (Editor's Note: The various
dissents and commentaries contained in chapter five of the Report are each sepa-
rately paginated.).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1994).
155. See Jones & Shepard, Dissent, supra note 44, at 11 (Editor's Note: The various
dissents and commentaries contained in chapter five of the Report are each sepa-
rately paginated.).
156. Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
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go back before the courts for approval again,"5' and that the real
problem in reaffirmations has not been creditor abuse-although
Sears is an obvious counterexample-but that so many reaffirmations
go through without adequate advice or counsel by the debtor's attor-
ney, or by the judge. We had enormous amounts of testimony about
how the debtors' attorneys really ought to counsel their clients better
on this subject. If they did, the law as it stands is adequate to protect
them.
We also had an alternative proposal, which I think will garner four
votes, on serial filings. It basically restricts filings to one every six
years, unless there is some administrative problem or particularly ex-
ceptional circumstances. 5 ' The idea there is that the Commission's
majority proposal, as it now stands, has a totally toothless ban on refil-
ings. If you take bankruptcy seriously, that it is a special matter of
dispensation by society from what is your ordinary obligation to pay
debt, then it should not be something that people can resort to with
impunity again and again and again, whenever they suffer setbacks.
This is appealing to the Congress, which has passed a five-year life-
time limit on welfare payments.'59 It seems to me that the people who
are in need of welfare are at least as deserving-or more so-than
many of the people who end up filing bankruptcy. So I do not regard
that as a serious stretch.
I will just conclude by reiterating a few little nostrums that have sort
of guided me during the consumer process.
I disagree very much with people's using the Bankruptcy Code
solely for the purpose of installing what they believe to be debtor-
friendly provisions, because if you take each one of them-the ones
that I mentioned in the framework to begin with-they turn out in the
aggregate and on the whole, and viewed in the context of the society
at large, not to be consumer-friendly. So every time you strip a lien in
bankruptcy or treat something as unsecured which was formerly se-
cured, it has consequences on the rest of society at large.
My other guiding principle has been that I do not think bankruptcy
law ought to substitute for state law unless it is absolutely necessary.
Butner v. United States"s° is one of the great under-appreciated deci-
sions that we have. I view bankruptcy as a mechanism to enforce state
law, not to add a bunch of remedies on top of what already appear in
state law.
Finally, I have the feeling that Congress is going to have to look at
all this very seriously now because, given this large a number of bank-
157. See Jones & Shepard, Dissent, supra note 44, at 10 (Editor's Note: The various
dissents and commentaries contained in chapter five of the Report are each sepa-
rately paginated.).
158. See id at 12.
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1)(7) (Supp. 1 1996).
160. 440 U.S. 48 (1978).
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ruptcies in a time of prosperity, somebody is going to be called to
account if the number triples or quadruples as soon as we have a
downturn, and they will be looking around for scapegoats. I will not
be there anymore; I will be back on the bench. I do not know who the
scapegoats will be.
There is no doubt in my mind that this reflects a social problem that
it would be better for us to nip in the bud than to wait until we actu-
ally see the fruits of it in the destruction of many people's household
finances. By analogy again to other social problems, we took a differ-
ent approach to crime in the 1960s and 1970s and rates of crime
skyrocketed. You see here that in New York rates have been ratchet-
ing downward once you took a more stringent approach to panhan-
dling and minor offenses. So I think the same thing can be done if we
will do it in bankruptcy, rather than have to wait until a crisis erupts.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Judge Jones.
Jane McNamara, any concluding words?
MS. McNAMARA: Thank you.
We talked about the moral issue of bankruptcy being available for
consumers, and the need for it and how should it be structured.
Bankruptcy has long-term social ramifications. Many times when
people file for divorce, the first reason they cite is that they had finan-
cial problems. Typically, the way people handle money is indicative of
how they communicate within the family. So as we see the rise in
bankruptcies, we see other social issues occurring-not only the losses
to creditors, but the disruption to families.
I already mentioned today, and I will say again, I think the Code
needs to be tightened and strengthened so it is not so easy to file
bankruptcy as it currently is, that there is a responsibility to pay back
the money that has been borrowed, in whatever capacity.
If the Code is changed, there is going to be a greater need for alter-
natives, because we will not see people seeking those remedies as they
currently are, and it is going to be even more important to have a
greater awareness of what those alternatives are to make early refer-
rals, to have cooperation from those people that are involved.
And education is going to become even more important because
right now there is not a great emphasis on that. Certainly, the con-
sumer credit counseling services can provide that role, but it is also
going to take cooperation and support, as well as education from cred-
itor groups.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you very much.
Hank Hildebrand?
MR. HILDEBRAND: I think that everybody here is aware that
the landscape is going to wind up changing, and it is going to change
maybe in the next eighteen months. It may be that in about a year, or
a year and a half, from now you will be attending a CLE talking about
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what Congress has just done in connection with the Bankruptcy Code.
The people here probably will not be surprised, no matter what hap-
pens out of this, because you would have heard it here, in one form or
another, first.
Let me do a little prognostication on this. Clearly the landscape has
changed. There will be a fundamental shift in how this country deals
with bankruptcy and consumer insolvency. That means that, as mem-
bers of the legal profession, we have an obligation to know what has
happened and how the law will change. I do not think it is any more
acceptable, nor will it be acceptable, for people to be able to know just
a little bit of that process.
I know that in many places in the country people just do not know
Chapter 13 because Chapter 7 is easier and it is accepted and you just
do not have to know it. I do not think that is going to be an accepta-
ble response anymore. I think, as you have heard all across the board
today-I think everybody is telling you that-that you will need to
know all aspects of consumer bankruptcy if you are going to practice
any aspect of consumer bankruptcy.
I think you have also heard today, and I think you are going to see
this in eighteen months, that education is going to be a critical element
of this process. Now, whether that education is done at the high
school level or whether the education is done at the pre-bankruptcy
level-which I call "Chapter selection"-or the post-bankruptcy level,
where we are trying to get people so that they go forth and sin no
more in this process, I think you are going to see education as being
an element of this, and you can look back in two years and say, "Yes,
that's right."
Finally, we are going to be talking for the next year, year and a half,
about this rub, where the judicial system and our consumer economic
system and our social welfare system rub together. We are going to
have to make some really serious decisions as to where these are dif-
ferentiated and where they blend together.
I think you are going to see that some of the assumptions that you
and I will make today will not be true in a year and a half from now.
We may be saying, "Gee, what happened? I don't remember how that
could happen." Or we may be saying, "Thank the Lord something has
happened to change that."
So I guess I leave here not knowing what is going to happen myself,
but with the thought that I know something will happen. So I en-
courage everybody to at least follow the process, because I think the
process itself is going to dictate the outcome.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Thank you, Hank.
Finally, Mike McEneney.
MR. McENENEY: Well, first, I hope that Hank is right and some-
thing does take place of a dramatic nature.
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I think, in closing, I would just say that I think you have heard to-
day-and it is probably something you have already known-that
consumer bankruptcy is extremely costly; the cost is not only borne by
creditors, but it is borne by all consumers that continue to pay their
debts. They bear that cost in the form of higher prices. The system,
by all accounts, in all likelihood is only going to become more costly.
I think in order to have a bankruptcy system that is fair and contin-
ues to work there has to be fundamental change in the Bankruptcy
Code. People have to be measured to determine how much bank-
ruptcy relief they need, and they've got to get just that relief that they
need-no more, no less. I think if that does not happen that the
ramifications will be much more significant than perhaps some
changes that impact bankrupt debtors. I think we will see a dramatic
increase in the cost of credit and a decrease in credit availability,
which, as I said earlier, is going to impact most greatly on those that
can least afford it, and those are the lower and moderate income fami-
lies that do not have a lot of alternatives available to them.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Will you join me, please, in thank-
ing the panel for coming here and giving us an extraordinarily worth-
while day?
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